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As a means of promoting preventive health behavior, incentives are becoming increasingly 
commonplace in healthcare and public policy. Yet relatively little research has been done on the 
different types of incentives (incentive, disincentive, and efficacy) or the means by which they 
can be used effectively in interventions to promote cancer screening. To examine these issues, a 
progression of four studies was designed. In the first experiment, undergraduate participants (N = 
300) were given questionnaires to determine the general effects of incentives based on 
hypotheses drawn from several related literatures in psychology. Incentive-based health 
messages regarding skin cancer were varied by the type of incentive, message frame (gain/loss) 
and target behavior (sunscreen use/skin cancer screening exam). Though no main effects were 
observed with respect to message frame or behavior, incentives were found to better promote 
both intentions to receive skin cancer screening as well as anticipated contentment regarding 
one’s ability to successfully engage in health behaviors than disincentives. Due to these findings, 
this study of incentives was simplified and expanded to relevant populations for colorectal 
cancer screening in two studies. Participants (N = 8 and N = 23) were given questionnaires 
designed to provide further insight on incentives—specifically, to assess the monetary amounts 
at which incentive messages would motivate them to undergo screening. Both incentives and 
disincentives were persuasive at fairly low monetary amounts, with no significant differences 
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observed between the means of these constructs. Trends observed in the results of the two studies 
suggested that disincentives may more effectively promote screening than incentives among an 
older population. Given these contradictory findings, a final archival study was conducted to 
assess trends in screening cross-culturally as a function of the use of incentives in extant 
governmental interventions. Cross-cultural comparison revealed that countries with efficacy-
based screening programs had significantly higher screening rates than those without such 
programs. With few comparative analyses on incentives currently in the literature, these studies 
were collectively aimed at complementing current understanding about incentives in the field of 
psychology and, by extension, about the effectiveness of the various incentive-based 
interventions that governments have been adopting in recent years. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
With the remarkable advances in medicine in recent years, preventive healthcare has been 
increasingly promoted as a critical tool for reducing incidence and mortality of many public 
health concerns, such as cancer. Underuse of many healthcare behaviors, from colorectal cancer 
screening to sunscreen use, however, has been observed among many target populations (Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2006c). For example, in developed countries, 
including the United States and Western Europe, colorectal cancer is the second leading cause of 
cancer-related death, and, in the US alone, it was projected to cause approximately 49,960 deaths 
in 2008 (American Cancer Society [ACS], 2006d). Paradoxically, incidence and mortality of 
colorectal cancer tends to be highest in developed countries, which have some of the best 
healthcare systems and medical technology in the world, yet it is one of the most preventable 
cancers, as ―more than 50% of all colon cancers can be prevented through lifestyle changes and 
widespread screening‖ (Colditz et al., 2005). Since screening detects and removes precancerous 
polyps, undergoing preventive screening for colorectal cancer reduces any individual’s risk for 
the disease by the greatest percentage—33% or more—, which is more than any single lifestyle 
change (Colditz et al., 2005).  
Despite this, however, many healthcare consumers of all ages do not utilize preventive 
medicine as directed. In fact, among those who are recommended to undergo screening for 
colorectal cancer—individuals at high risk for the disease and everyone over 50 years of age—
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screening rates in Germany (Altenhofen, 2006) remain below 50%, as did screening rates in 
England (Rhodes, 2000) until recently. In the US, screening rates in general have risen slowly, 
but are only in the 50-60% range for most states (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
[CDC], 2006c). Among younger populations, according to the most recent data from the Health 
Information National Trends Survey conducted by the National Cancer Institute, more than half 
of Americans age 18 and older report an underuse of sunscreen and approximately 49% report 
using sunscreen only ―rarely‖ or ―never‖ (HINTS, 2005).  
Healthcare plans and governments in these countries have begun to react to the underuse 
of preventive care by incorporating incentives into interventions and public policy in the form of 
screening programs, with the hope of increasing the utilization of preventive medicine (National 
Conference of State Legislatures, 2007; Pallarito, 2005; National Health Service, 2003; 2006; 
Schmiegel, 2007; Tuffs, 2006). In 2003, the European Council approved a Commission 
recommendation that colorectal cancer screening—specifically programs encouraging screening 
through the use of fecal occult blood tests for individuals between the ages of 50-74—should be 
encouraged for all member states of the EU (Council of the European Union, 2003). Currently, 
there is growing pressure for a massive effort by the European Commission to promote the 
implementation of national screening programs throughout all of its member states in the action 
plan ―Europe against Colorectal Cancer‖ (International Digestive Cancer Alliance, Netzwerk 
gegen Darmkrebs, & Felix Burda Foundation, 2007; European Commission, 2007a).  
As countries in both the EU and across the world begin to institute such screening 
programs, the effectiveness of types of incentives as a motivational tool in medical 
communications for increasing uptake of preventive health behaviors, such as cancer screening 
and sunscreen use, has become increasingly important as an object of empirical scrutiny. 
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1.1 THE SCREENING TESTS 
Among the available screening tests for colorectal cancer, the three for which there are national 
guidelines within the United States are the fecal occult blood test (FOBT), sigmoidoscopy, and 
colonoscopy. Fecal occult blood tests are essentially home-test-kits, for which patients place 
three samples of their stool on a card and then send the card to a medical laboratory, where the 
samples are examined for blood and other abnormalities. In contrast, sigmoidoscopies and 
colonoscopies are both forms of endoscopy, in which a lighted tube—or ―scope‖—is inserted 
into the rectum for visual analysis. According to the national guidelines established by the 
American Cancer Society—which have also been adopted in the European Union—, all 
individuals over 50 years of age and anyone under 50 at high risk due to family history or a 
personal history of polyps should undergo an FOBT annually, a sigmoidoscopy once every five 
years, or a colonoscopy once every ten years. The average costs of these exams range from an 
estimated $7 per FOBT to $557 per colonoscopy, with the sigmoidoscopy falling within that 
range at an average cost of $174 (Campbell, Coates & Chattopadhyay, 2006). 
1.2 CURRENT POLICIES 
Before discussing the psychological mechanisms involved in or related to incentive message 
processing, three current governmental practices have been selected as case studies. These 
policies have been chosen for review, because they are among the most comprehensively enacted 
and researched of all current colorectal cancer screening polices at the federal level. 
Furthermore, they represent the spectrum of the types of screening programs currently being 
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offered by governments: a national program (UK), no program (US), and a national opportunistic 
program (Germany). In general, for an intervention to be considered a program, ―there should be 
a public screening policy documented in a law, or an official regulation, decision, directive or 
recommendation. The policy should define, as a minimum, the screening test, the examination 
intervals and the group of persons eligible to be screened; and the screening examinations should 
be financed by public sources (apart from a possible co-payment)‖ (European Commission, 
2007a, p. 14). Though there is some discrepancy in the literature regarding the difference 
between national and national opportunistic programs, for the purposes of these analyses, they 
will be delineated by the fact that, for a national opportunistic program, screening is offered and 
screening facilities are monitored by the government; however, individuals are responsible for 
requesting the tests themselves (Kanavos, Schurer, Owusu-Apenten & Sullivan, 2008). In 
contrast, national programs typically involve formal invitations sent to a target population 
(European Commission, 2007a).  Most importantly, these three countries have been selected 
because they will be shown to collectively provide a comprehensive depiction of incentives, in 
that each exemplifies one of the three different types (efficacy, incentives, and disincentives). 
1.2.1 United Kingdom 
Perhaps the most intuitive and predictable governmental intervention is one in which the 
government directly intervenes in public policy on a national scale to catalyze the change it is 
advocating. With the gradual implementation of its ―National Screening Programme,‖ the British 
government exemplifies such an intervention. The program, itself, is twofold. First, the 
government—more specifically, its publicly funded organ, the National Health Service, which is 
designated for developing and implementing healthcare policy—provides the target population 
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with FOBT kits and directions about how to complete and return them for analysis. In addition, 
the government has constructed specialized centers whose sole function is to analyze these tests. 
Unclear or abnormal results found by these centers are then communicated to the patient, who 
then either is asked to repeat the FOBT or is referred for a colonoscopy.  
The implementation of this program on a national scale began in 2006 after two pilot 
studies conducted in 2001 and 2003 consistently demonstrated an increase in FOBT screening as 
a result of this type of government intervention, achieving uptake rates of approximately 60% 
(National Health Service, 2003) and approximately 50% (National Health Service, 2006), 
respectively. Especially in the second trial, the highest uptake of FOBT screening was observed 
in the cohort of 60-70 year-olds (National Health Service, 2006) as shown below. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Estimated colorectal cancer screening uptake in the second English pilot study as a function of age and 
gender (National Health Service, 2006) 
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Prior to government intervention, screening rates in Great Britain had been estimated to 
be about 45% (Rhodes, 2000). Thus, based on the results obtained from the pilot studies, 
providing FOBT’s to the at-risk population successfully increased the national screening average 
by a minimum of five percent. Yet both pilots targeted the same individuals with the intent of 
monitoring not only the adoption of cancer screening behavior, but also the maintenance and 
continued performance of that behavior. That a ten percent decrease in participation was 
observed in the population between the first and second trials, therefore, suggests that there may 
be limitations to the effectiveness of this program in terms of its ability to foster both adoption 
and maintenance behavior throughout the population. 
1.2.2 The United States  
Whereas England has a publicly funded healthcare system, which facilitates the implementation 
of a nation-wide program that directly advocates screening, the healthcare system in the United 
States operates primarily within the private sector. Therefore, US interventions cannot as readily 
be federally generated, and have assumed a more indirect nature—namely, regulation of the 
private insurance industry. In fact, the only existing national initiative for insurance coverage of 
colorectal cancer screening tests is offered by Medicare, which provides its recipients with full 
coverage for one FOBT annually and partial coverage for one sigmoidoscopy every four years or 
one colonoscopy every ten years, subject to a percentage of the deductable (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention [CDC], 2006b).  
With national screening rates in the United States estimated to be in the 50-60% range for 
most states (CDC, 2006c), state, rather than national, policies have begun to be developed and 
implemented since the late 1990’s. These laws require coverage of preventive cancer screening 
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tests from insurance companies within the state. Currently, only 29 states have instituted policies 
requiring insurance plans to include coverage of these tests. Of those laws, several are vague and 
lack the necessary specificity to effectively regulate insurance coverage according to national 
guidelines. For example, in Texas, insurance coverage is mandated for all insurance plans, but 
only for individuals over 50 years old (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2007). 
National guidelines, however, recommend that individuals under 50 years of age who are at high 
risk of the disease due to family history or other risk factors such as chronic inflammatory bowel 
disease also receive screening. Legislation in Wyoming necessitates preventive screening 
coverage; but, it only applies to ―nonsymptomatic‖ individuals under HMO’s or group plans and, 
moreover, fails to specify how often insurance companies must cover these tests, as it does not 
reference national guidelines (House Bill No. HB0026, 2001). In Alabama, Oklahoma, and 
Tennessee, legislation does address colorectal coverage by insurance providers; however, it only 
requires them to offer such coverage and does not mandate that they actually must cover these 
tests according to ACS guidelines (National Cancer Institute [NCI], 2005b).  
Due to this variability in the adequacy of preventive screening legislation, the American 
Gastroenterological Association, in cooperation with several other agencies, has issued annual 
reports of state laws since 2004, assigning letter grades from A-D and F, based on the specificity 
and comprehensiveness of the laws and their adherence to national guidelines. In the most recent 
―Colorectal Cancer Legislation Report Card,‖ the laws in 22 states received ―A’s,‖ because they 
adhere to national guidelines, mandate coverage under all insurance plans, and include 
provisions to account for future advances in preventive screening. Four states, including Texas, 
received B’s for adequately meeting current screening guidelines but lacking the specificity 
required for an ―A‖ rating, whereas legislation in three states, including Wyoming, received C’s, 
because their laws fail to specify which tests and which demographics of insurance consumers 
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must be covered. Finally, the aforementioned states requiring only that insurance coverage is 
offered received D’s, and the nineteen states lacking legislation received F’s.  
In 2006, the American Cancer Society conducted a retrospective analysis according to 
these classifications, comparing yearly the screening rates of eleven states that have had 
colorectal cancer screening legislation since 1999 and have received ―A‖ ratings for this 
legislation with states that have never had legislation. For the first two years after the 
implementation of preventive screening laws, screening rates in both groups were found to have 
increased at an equal rate; however, after the laws began to take effect, an interesting difference 
was observed (see below). Although screening rates in both groups increased, rates within those 
states with insurance coverage laws increased 40% faster than screening rates in the states 
without such legislation (ACS, 2006c). Thus, state laws mandating insurance coverage of cancer 
screening was shown to be effective in facilitating the adoption of cancer screening behavior. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Colorectal cancer screening rates in the United States as a function of time in states with 
legislation mandating colorectal cancer screening insurance coverage versus states without such legislation 
(American Cancer Society, 2006c) 
 9 
One objection arising to such laws, however, is that, because insurance is largely based in 
the private sector in the US, many people do not have health insurance. According to the 
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), though almost all Americans over the age of 65 have 
health insurance due to their participation in Medicare, 19% of Americans under the age of 65 
lack health insurance (CDC, 2006a). Consequently, although legislation requiring insurance 
coverage may be effective at increasing cancer screening rates among the insured population, the 
uninsured one-fifth of the US population under 65 does not benefit from it. Indeed, studies have 
shown that having insurance is correlated with higher colorectal cancer screening rates (Codori, 
Petersen, Miglioretti & Boyd, 2001). 
 In 2000, therefore, the state of Maryland sought to address this problem by implementing 
a ―state cancer program,‖ which provided the opportunity for uninsured individuals to receive 
free endoscopy screening. An observational study of this program among the uninsured 
population in one Maryland County found that screening rates increased dramatically, from 13% 
prior to the program to 52% after the program had taken effect (Sarfaty & Feng, 2005). As a 
whole, therefore, government interventions within the US, which tend to be directed at reducing 
financial barriers to screening, have consistently met with widespread success in recent years. 
Finally, colorectal cancer screening and other preventive health behaviors are being 
advocated in the US not only through state action, but also within the private sector by insurance 
companies, themselves. Consumer Directed Healthcare—more commonly known as 
personalized healthcare—is the overall term encompassing a new construct for insurance plans. 
Offered by companies such as Humana and PacifiCare, these plans provide insurance consumers 
with more control in their health decision-making by offsetting high premiums—which generally 
are more expensive than premiums associated with regular insurance plans—with opportunities 
to receive benefits that are often in the form of premium reductions or lotteries. 
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1.2.3 Germany 
Unlike England and the United States, Germany has had a national program for colorectal cancer 
screening in effect since 1977 in West Germany and the early 1990’s in East Germany after the 
reunification (Schmiegel, 2006). This program offers free annual FOBT’s to all residents ages 45 
and older. As the use of colonoscopy became more prevalent and accepted among the medical 
community in Germany, yet another program was instituted. Beginning in 2002, this program 
stipulated that all residents between the ages of 50-54 would continue to receive free annual 
FOBT and would automatically become eligible for one free colonoscopy screening every ten 
years after age 55 (Schmiegel, 2006; Loss, Eichhorn & Nagel, 2005). Both of these programs, 
however, are opportunistic in structure and thus leave the pursuit of the actual tests to the 
individual. Since all residents are required to have insurance due to the socialized healthcare 
system under which the country operates, over 90% are covered by public insurance, whereas the 
other ten percent generally has private insurance coverage, for which those individuals had to 
have been given special permission by the government. As a result, not only have these 
programs, especially the FOBT program, been enacted far longer than most of the other cancer 
screening interventions currently in existence, but also the ability to participate in these programs 
is not restricted to any one social stratum or contingent upon having health insurance. Given 
these circumstances, many of the difficulties in some of the more recent government policies, 
such as the possible ceiling effect of the English program and the restricted applicability of many 
US interventions to only insured populations, seem to be addressed in the German programs. 
Furthermore, public awareness of both colonoscopy and FOBT is 30% higher in Germany than 
in the US (Loss, Eichhorn & Nagel, 2005; National Cancer Institute, 2005). 
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Despite these factors, German colorectal cancer screening rates are still lower than those 
in England and the United States. As of 2002, it was estimated that only 17% of men and less 
than 30% of women underwent screening (Felix Burda Stiftung, 2002). According to the German 
Central Institute for German Healthcare and Insurance, when stratified by age and gender, the 
highest screening frequency for FOBT was 35%, occurring among the 50-54 age group; 
however, for men, the peak screening rate was only 16% among the 65-69 age group 
(Altenhofen, 2006). Colonoscopy screening was even lower, with cumulative totals of 12.7% for 
women and only 11.2% for men between 2003-2006 (Altenhofen, 2008) (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Colonoscopy screening rates in Germany from 2003-2006 as a function of age and gender 
Thus, the German government implemented a new law in its 2007 Healthcare Reform 
Package. According to this law, residents of Germany who fail to undergo regular preventive 
cancer screening after April 1, 2007 and later develop cancer ―have to contribute a maximum of 
two percent of their gross income towards their treatment rather than the maximum one percent 
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that all other patients with a chronic disease have to pay‖ (Tuffs, 2007, ¶ 3). While the 
government hopes that this new measure will increase national screening rates, public reception 
of this new law has been mixed; therefore, its ultimate effectiveness is uncertain. 
1.2.4 Government Interventions: Some Cross-Cultural Factors  
In examining these policies, it is an incontrovertible fact that many cross-cultural variables—
such as the different healthcare systems and possible variation in perceived social acceptability 
and stigma concerning colorectal cancer screening in different cultures—may indeed be 
inexorably linked with the observed screening rate disparities among England, the US, and 
Germany. Indeed, there are differences in expectations of the healthcare system and general 
beliefs about the extent to which the government should be involved in regulating it. For 
example, Anspruchsdenken is the German ―mentality of entitlement‖ toward healthcare, for 
which there is no counterpart in British or American culture (Cockerham, Kunz & Lueschen, 
1988). This term denotes the belief among the German population, arising in virtue of their 
socialized healthcare system, that they have a right to demand and receive medical treatment.  
Americans, in contrast, tend to prefer less government involvement in the healthcare 
system (Cockerham et al., 1988), but media campaigns have been successful at increasing 
screening uptake. In particular, Katie Couric underwent an on-air colonoscopy in March of 2000, 
which significantly increased subsequent screening rates in what is called the ―Katie Couric 
effect‖ (Cram et al., 2003). British society, meanwhile, still has a much more defined social class 
structure than Germany or the US (Cockerham et al., 1988), and its often salacious tabloid press 
holds more influence over public opinion than in either of the other countries. Given the history 
of media influence in the US, this latter factor may also contribute to health beliefs in the UK.  
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Though there may be cultural differences, however, several studies have shown that 
health beliefs and behavior—at least in regard to cancer screening—do show similar cross-
cultural trends, suggesting that, at least in Western society, there may be some relevant and 
interesting heuristics in health decision-making that remain constant across all three cultures. 
One cross-cultural study by Cockerham, Kunz, and Lueschen (1988) found no significant 
differences in everyday health behavior outside the context of the actual healthcare system, in 
terms of perceptions of and participation in variables such as exercise, diet, and relaxation. 
Furthermore, the variables of education and socioeconomic status (SES)—as operationalized in 
the US in terms of lack of health insurance—have been shown to moderate screening rates in 
both the US (ACS, 2006a; Codori, Petersen, Miglioretti & Boyd, 2001) and Germany (Heisel et 
al., n.d.), in that lower levels of education and SES have been consistently correlated with 
reduced screening rates among populations with those characteristics, as shown below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Colorectal cancer screening rates for sigmoidoscopy and colonoscopy among individuals 50 
years and older in the United States as a function of level of education and socioeconomic status, as indicated by 
lack of health insurance, over time (ACS, 2006a) 
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Preliminary to the development of the series of experiments reported in this paper, a literature 
review was conducted on previous research on incentives as well as related literatures on 
message framing, regulatory focus, and risk perceptions. 
2.1 INCENTIVES 
Throughout all of the aforementioned government interventions, the unifying commonality is the 
use of incentives. The term ―incentives‖ refers to the class of financial or economic factors 
imposed with the intent of motivating an individual to adopt or refrain from a behavior (Kane, 
Johnson, Town & Butler, 2004). Incentives are divisible into three main constructs, depending 
on the nature of the incentive and the expectation associated with it: efficacy, incentives, and 
disincentives. To eliminate confusion, ―contingency‖ will henceforth be used to describe the 
group as a whole. Efficacy operates by enhancing perceptions of self-efficacy, which is the belief 
that one possesses the ability or the resources to successfully perform a desired behavior (Wood 
& Bandura, 1989). Enhanced self-efficacy has been correlated with increased efforts toward 
behavior change (Bandura & Adams, 1977) and has consistently been found to increase 
participation for many different health behaviors, including cancer screening (Kane et al., 2004), 
especially when the degree of efficacy is increased (Courtier et al., 2002). Indeed, the English 
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program provides efficacy by removing ambiguity concerning the acquisition and completion of 
the test, and state laws for compulsory insurance coverage of screening tests indirectly reduce 
financial barriers by requiring insurance companies to accept some of the burden of the cost.  
Incentives, meanwhile, are rewards for performing a given behavior that may or may not 
be related in function to the behavior they are reinforcing. For instance, if a patient underwent 
colorectal cancer screening because he or she had been promised $50 for doing so, the patient 
would be responding to an incentive. Although this incentive could be used by the patient to help 
defray the costs of the appointment later—which may tempt one to classify it as efficacy—this 
incentive inherently differs from efficacy in that it does not improve the patient’s ability to get 
the test. Instead, it is a reward received only after the behavior has been completed. The growing 
trend in the private insurance industry within the US of Consumer Directed Health Care signifies 
a tendency toward the use of incentives. For instance, PacifiCare insurance offers its employees 
personalized healthcare policies, under which they receive points for participating in healthy 
behaviors. With these points, they can receive incentives, either in the form of discounts on other 
health services or entry in lotteries for prizes, such as treadmills and iPods (Pallarito, 2005). 
Disincentives promote behavior instead by threatening inaction with an unwanted 
outcome. In other words, if individuals fail to perform a behavior, such as cancer screening, they 
will lose some previously held advantage and/or gain some unwanted disadvantage. Thus, 
disincentives motivate individuals to alter their behavior due to their desires to avoid a given 
outcome. In theory, disincentives could be used to either engender the cessation of a negative 
behavior or reinforce a positive health behavior. Among current legislation, the new German law 
is an example of this construct, in that residents who fail to receive screening tests according to 
national guidelines must later pay twice as much on treatment as they would have if they had 
gotten screened. In this case, the disincentive that would be incurred if an individual fails to be 
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screened is the higher cost of subsequent cancer treatment, and the previously held advantage 
that would be lost if that individual fails to be screened is the opportunity for lower payments.    
One point to note about the distinction between these three constructs is that, although 
included in the context of contingency, efficacy is unique because there is generally no condition 
that must be satisfied to get it. Individuals do not have to do anything to earn or get efficacy 
under interventions such as the UK screening program. Instead, they receive invitations and 
FOBT kits in the mail and can then choose to complete the test or ignore it. In contrast, the 
performance or non-performance of a target behavior determines whether an individual will 
receive incentives of disincentives, meaning that the reception of these rewards and punishments 
is contingent upon that individual’s behavior. Despite this apparent incompatibility, efficacy is 
still included as a contingency construct due to the nature of its role in existing interventions. 
Just as existing programs provide incentives or disincentives to encourage target behaviors, they 
also promote such behaviors by providing the ability (efficacy) to perform them. Though the 
reception of this increased ability to perform the behavior is not necessarily dependant on 
previous actions, the use of efficacy is a type of provision made in many government 
interventions that is compatible with the goals of the use of the other contingency constructs.  
An additional reason for efficacy’s inclusion along the spectrum of contingency is that it 
can also be used contingently. In the English program, efficacy is in fact contingent in terms of 
the follow-up tests. Receiving a free colonoscopy as a part of the program is only possible if the 
FOBT kits are completed and an abnormal result is obtained. Economic barriers to receiving a 
colonoscopy—namely, the cost—are removed for participants, but only after they have 
completed the home test kit. Vouchers for bus rides to screening centers or for future tests 
similarly are examples of efficacy that could be used in a contingent way. 
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According to a review by Kane et al. (2004), ―Financial incentives [contingency], if they 
are big enough, can influence discrete behavior at the individual level in the short run‖ (p. 350). 
This finding is fairly intuitive. Most people would not refuse to undergo even colorectal cancer 
screening if they were given $500 to pay for it, were promised a $500 reward for doing so, or 
were threatened with a $500 fine for not doing so. Yet despite the long tradition of Skinnerian 
operant conditioning and behavioristic analyses of contingency regarding dieting and even 
smoking (Elder & Neef, 1986), research on its role in cancer screening is much less complete. 
Although many studies have shown that efficacy serves to facilitate behaviors, the research in the 
social psychological literature on contingency remains especially sparse regarding the effects of 
and comparisons between the effectiveness of incentives and disincentives in health messages. 
Other issues further complicate this analysis. What amount constitutes ―big enough‖? What role 
do other factors such as perceived risk or the ―red tape‖ of the healthcare system play? And, if 
they do manage to encourage behavior adoption, for how long is contingency effective? 
Although little is known about the roles of incentives and disincentives in the context of 
behavior adoption models, efficacy has been identified as an important element within several 
theories of behavior change that have been applied to preventive cancer screening behavior, such 
as the protection motivation theory (Weinstein, Rothman & Sutton, 1998), health belief model 
(Rawl et al., 2001; Janz, Wren, Schottenfeld & Guire, 2003), and the precaution adoption process 
model (PAPM) (Weinstein, 1993; Weinstein, Rothman & Sutton, 1998; Costanza et al., 2005). 
The PAPM in particular posits the existence of seven distinguishable stages during the adoption 
of a behavior: unaware; unengaged; deciding about acting; decided not to act; decided to act; 
acting; and maintenance. In tests of the PAPM, efficacy has been shown to play a role in the 
facilitating the transition from the stage in which a person has decided to act to the stage of 
actually performing the behavior—or ―acting‖—(Weinstein, Lyon, Sandman & Cuite, 1998).   
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2.2 MESSAGE FRAMING 
Due to the lack of empirical research on the effects of contingency in health messages, insight on 
contingency may be gained through an examination of the related literatures on ―gain‖ versus 
―loss‖ message framing. In general, message framing refers to the context in which a health 
communication is conveyed. Research on this topic has typically operationalized benefits and 
losses in terms of positive and negative health outcomes, respectively (Rothman, Bartels, 
Wlaschin & Salovey, 2006). Ostensibly, contingency seems to parallel this construct. Incentives 
emphasize the fiscal or economic benefits one can incur by performing a behavior, whereas 
disincentives direct attention to the economic losses that will be incurred if the desired behavior 
is not performed. This means that contingency reoperationalizes the goals used in message 
framing, because it shifts the goals from achieving good health or avoiding bad health—the 
objects of intrinsic motivation—to external, economic rewards—the object of extrinsic 
motivation, thereby serving as a potential bridge between two well-researched bodies of 
psychological literature. 
According to this research, framing a health message in terms of gains or losses has 
consistently been shown to differentially influence subsequent behavior adoption. Specifically, 
gain-framed messages are more effective at promoting uptake of prevention behaviors, whereas 
loss-framed messages more successfully encourage detection behaviors (Rothman, Martino, 
Bedell, Detweiler & Salovey, 1997; Rothman, Bartels, Wlaschin & Salovey, 2006). As prospect 
theory explains, this is because people are risk-averse (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981). When 
faced with a choice of incuring losses versus receiving definite gains, people will choose the 
course of action from which they can receive rewards. People thus prefer health-affirming 
(prevention) behaviors to illness-detecting (detection) behaviors in response to messages that 
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emphasize gains, because the latter behaviors carry an implicit risk of uncovering a disease of 
which they were previously ignorant (Rothman et al., 2006). Undergoing cancer screening, for 
example, might uncover cancer, so individuals will not be as motivated to perform it as they 
would a behavior that reassures them about their health (a prevention behavior), given a choice 
between the two. Indeed, the majority of Americans polled believe that colorectal cancer 
screening is effective at detecting cancer (NCI, 2005a) and, accordingly, a detection behavior. 
Conversely, in situations where the choice is between a definite loss and a possible one (as in 
cancer screening), people tend to be risk-taking (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981), choosing the 
course of action in which accruing a loss is only a possibility. This is why messages emphasizing 
losses best encourage detection behaviors, as it is more appealing to face a possible loss by 
performing a detection behavior than to endure the definite loss stressed in the message. 
Logically there should be no difference. If a person has a disease, this person has it 
whether or not he or she is aware of it. Yet people do not tend to follow this reasoning for health 
decisions and therefore respond differentially to message frames. Messages incorporating 
contingency may therefore replicate these findings, in the sense that incentives best promote 
prevention behaviors and disincentives most effectively promote detection behaviors. The effects 
of such messages may also be moderated by framing, in that incentives may be most effective at 
increasing behavior when framed as gain-oriented messages, whereas disincentives may be most 
effective at encouraging behaviors when conveyed as loss-oriented messages.     
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2.3 REGULATORY FOCUS 
The body of research on regulatory focus may offer insight on contingency in another way. The 
literature on regulatory focus concerns the motivational orientation of individuals and, 
consequently, may provide a theoretical basis as to why the outcomes proposed in contingency 
serve as motivational tools to encourage participation in health behaviors. Extrapolated from the 
principles of hedonism, the theory of regulatory focus seeks to explain in more precise terms 
than just ―pleasure‖ and ―pain‖ why certain outcomes are more appealing than others, given an 
individual’s orientation toward a decision. Regulatory focus theory, therefore, makes several 
distinctions. Most fundamentally, it distinguishes between two goal states: the actual self, or the 
person one currently is, and the ideal self, or the person one wants to be.  
Discrepancies between the actual and ideal selves are addressed with one of two types of 
regulatory focus. Promotion focus refers to an orientation toward positive outcomes and gains, 
such as love or respect (Higgins, 1997; Higgins, Roney, Crowe & Hymes, 1994). A promotion-
focused individual seeks to move toward his or her ideal self, thereby focusing on the positive 
end results of his/her actions. Prevention focus, however, refers to a concern with the negative 
outcomes or losses, such as criticism, that could arise from a failure to perform a behavior and 
move an individual farther away from the ideal self (Higgins, 1997; Higgins, et al., 1994).  
The theory suggests that individuals act to resolve these discrepancies (Higgins, 1997; 
Higgins et al., 1994; Higgins, 2000). Higgins et al. (1994) proposed that individuals choose to 
perform actions in two ways: either with an approach or an avoidance system. As the names 
indicate, the former system refers to a construct used for behaviors with desired outcomes in 
order for individuals to bring themselves closer to their ideal states. Meanwhile, the latter system 
is the response to the potential for an undesired outcome, in which an individual will avoid a 
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behavior if it will enhance the preexisting disparity between the ideal and actual selves. The term 
regulatory fit is used to describe the match between the means to achieve the desired outcome 
and the orientation of that individual (either promotion or prevention focus) (Higgins, 2000).  
Based on this research, regulatory focus has been shown to differentially influence 
tendencies to adopt approach or avoidence systems (Higgins et al., 1994; Higgins, 1997; 
Higgins, 2000). In Higgins et al. (1994), promotion-focused individuals were found to 
consistently exhibit an affinity for approach systems, whereas prevention-focused individuals 
preferred avoidance systems. Accordingly, the regulatory fit of contingency to the orientation of 
the individual (promotion or prevention focus) may influence its efficacy in promoting health 
behaviors. In other words, if contingency is matched with strategy (incentives paired with 
approach systems and disincentives with avoidance systems), it should be perceived as more 
relevant in achieving the desired goal and thus should increase the desire to perform the 
behavior. For example, Shah, Higgins, and Friedman (1998) framed contingency in an anagram 
task in terms of gains (promotion focus) or losses (prevention focus). This task could be 
approached in two ways: either by manipulating the green tiles, with the possible outcome of 
gaining one dollar if the task was completed properly, or by focusing on the red tiles, with the 
possibility of avoiding the loss of a dollar if the task was completed. Results confirmed that 
chronic regulatory focus moderated the interaction between contingency and performance on the 
task. In particular, individuals who received contingency framed in a way that matched their 
chronic regulatory focus (promotion x promotion and prevention x prevention) tended to direct 
their attention more closely to the green and red tiles, respectively (Shah et al., 1998). Given 
these findings, the interaction between contingency and regulatory focus in health messages 
should mirror this pattern.  
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2.4 RISK PERCEPTIONS 
Finally, individuals’ assessments of risk have been shown to independently predict cancer 
screening and, in this way, may serve as a source of intrinsic motivation for preventive health 
behavior. In general, a higher perceived risk is associated with an increased likelihood to screen 
for colorectal cancer (Codori, Peterson, Miglioretti & Boyd, 2001; Codori et al., 2005). Family 
history has also been correlated with both a higher perceived and actual risk, as well as increased 
intentions to screen for a variety of cancers, including colorectal, breast, and skin cancers (Shah 
et al., 2007; Shah, Zhu, Palmer & Wu, 2007; Hay et al., 2005; Cameron, 2007).  
The success of contingency-based interventions that appeal to extrinsic motivation may 
thus be influenced by individuals’ preexisting risk perceptions. Indeed, if patients think they are 
at risk for cancer, either due to family history or due to perceived or objective risk, they may be 
more persuaded to screen by the threat of punishments for not doing so for the same reasons that 
loss-framed messages best promote detection behaviors. When individuals have a higher risk, 
they may be more risk-averse toward a detection behavior, such as screening. As a result, the 
threat of a greater loss in the form of a monetary disincentive may be a factor that is able to 
overcome inhibitions arising from risk-aversion and encourage the behavior anyway. 
Conversely, if individuals recognize few or no risk factors, they could be less likely to screen, 
despite any possible penalties. Among these individuals, incentives may be more effective at 
promoting screening behavior, because they are less likely to regard a behavior as potentially 
illness-detecting, even if the behavior is inherently a detection behavior, such as screening. In 
other words, if someone believes that he or she is at minimal risk for cancer, even cancer 
screening, which is aimed at detecting preexisting illnesses, will not pose as great a threat as it 
would for individuals with high perceived or objective risk. 
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Furthermore, risk perceptions for colorectal cancer tend to be overestimated (Codori et 
al., 2005), with many factors, including family history and personal history with related medical 
problems such as polyps, involved in these assessments of risk (Stark, Bertone-Johnson, 
Costanza & Stoddard, 2006; Codori, Petersen, Miglioretti & Boyd, 2001). Any intervention 
aiming to provide information about colorectal cancer and communicate accurate depictions of 
risk, therefore, may actually inhibit the adoption of screening behavior, as people with high 
perceived risk but low actual risk may view communications about their actual risk with relief 
and conclude that screening tests are less necessary. This may have even contributed to the 10% 
decline in screening uptake in the English pilot study populations between the 2001 and 2003 
trials (National Health Service, 2003; 2006), in that those individuals who had completed an 
FOBT in 2001 thereby learned not only about their actual risk for colorectal cancer, but also that 
screening lowers risk. As a result, some may have failed to screen again. The effect of the 
interaction between perceived risk and extrinsic incentives, therefore, merits further examination. 
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3.0  EXPERIMENTAL INQUIRY 
Due to all of these related literatures and potentially relevant variables, drawing conclusions 
about the effectiveness of contingency in promoting preventive health behavior is complex. On 
the one hand, the literature review by Kane et al. (2004) suggests that contingency is effective in 
the short run for promoting discrete behaviors. On the other hand, few studies in the 
psychological literature examine the effects of contingency in the context of health and the 
adoption of health behaviors, consider the influence of other variables such as framing and risk 
perceptions on contingency, or analyze the types of contingency in comparison with one another. 
Given the lack of conclusive evidence regarding contingency and the often conflicting results of 
the existing analyses, a progression of four studies was formulated and conducted. 
 In the first experiment, contingency was examined among an undergraduate population to 
examine several general hypotheses derived from the associated literatures. Subsequently, 
questionnaires for an older population were developed to assess the effects of contingency 
specifically on colorectal cancer screening first in a small pilot study and then in the context of a 
larger survey. Finally, national rates of screening behavior were compared cross-culturally to 
determine trends in colorectal cancer screening behavior and correlate these trends with extant 
national screening programs.  
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3.1 EXPERIMENT 1: UNDERGRADUATE SAMPLE 
Using a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design, the first experiment tested four hypotheses by varying three 
types of contingency-based messages (incentive, disincentive, and information-only (control)). 
For each contingency condition, message framing was varied in terms of gain and loss in order to 
determine if contingency can be mapped directly onto gain- and loss- frames or if contingency 
influences responses to health messages in ways that are independent of the frame of the 
message. Behavior type was also varied within each contingency x message frame condition. In 
other words, contingency messages were framed both in terms of gain and losses, and each gain 
and loss message was further subdivided to focus on a prevention behavior (sunscreen use) or a 
detection behavior (skin cancer screening). The objective for this was to determine if there is an 
interaction between contingency and type of behavior that may parallel, but is independent of, 
the established effects of message framing on behavior. 
3.1.1 Hypotheses 
First, [1] it was predicted that incentives framed as gain-oriented messages will be more effective 
at increasing intentions to do prevention behaviors than loss-framed messages about incentives. 
Disincentives framed as loss oriented messages were predicted to be more effective at increasing 
intentions to get screened. Additionally, [2] disincentives were believed to cause individuals to 
express greater intentions to be screened for skin cancer than to use sunscreen. Meanwhile, 
individuals who received incentive messages were expected to express greater intentions to use 
sunscreen than to receive a skin cancer screening exam. Essentially, these two hypotheses reflect 
the idea that the interactions between gain- and loss-framing of health messages and types of 
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health behaviors can be mapped onto contingency. In other words, if contingency is just a 
reconceptualization of message frame, in that the former focuses on more tangible fiscal rewards 
or punishments than the latter, it should show the same interactions with the type of health 
behavior as message frame. In short, incentives should best promote intentions for prevention 
behaviors (sunscreen use) and disincentives should engender the highest intentions to receive 
skin cancer screening exams. This should be the case both when incentives and disincentives are 
paired with gain- and loss-framed messages, respectively, and independently of message frame.  
Based on the literature on regulatory focus, it was also predicted [3] that when 
contingency was matched with frame, participants would show higher regulatory fit. 
Specifically, participants were expected to associate more anticipated satisfaction with successful 
completion of the behavior (either sunscreen use or skin cancer screening) in response to an 
incentive-message and less anticipated satisfaction about failing to perform that behavior. In 
other words, participants who received incentive messages were expected to anticipate being 
happier about successfully using sunscreen or screening for skin cancer if they received incentive 
messages, and this would be especially true when the incentives were gain-framed. This is 
because gain-framed incentive messages were expected to orient individuals toward the gains 
they would receive by performing the behavior (thereby activating a promotion focus), which 
would result in a preference for performing the behavior (an approach strategy). In contrast, 
individuals receiving disincentive messages about a behavior (either using sunscreen or getting 
screened for skin cancer) would be more dissatisfied than the information-only or incentive 
conditions about the prospect of failing to perform the behavior, and this would be especially 
true when these disincentives were loss-framed. This was because loss-framed disincentive 
messages would emphasize the losses from not doing the behavior (thereby activating a 
prevention focus). Consequently, individuals in these disincentive conditions were expected to 
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demonstrate a preference for avoiding the loss or disincentive (an avoidence strategy), and would 
report higher anticipated dissatisfaction at the prospect of failing to do so. 
Finally, [4] higher baseline risk perceptions for skin cancer were expected to moderate 
intentions to get screened in response to disincentives, such that higher risk perceptions would be 
correlated with higher intentions to screen. Lower risk perceptions for skin cancer, conversely, 
were predicted to be correlated with increased intentions to use sunscreen in response to 
incentives. 
3.1.2 Method 
3.1.2.1  Participants 
The participants were male and female Introduction to Psychology students (N = 300) at the 
University of Pittsburgh. Of these participants, 65.3% were female. They received credit toward 
their research participation requirement. 
3.1.2.2  Experimental Procedure  
This experiment followed a 3 (contingency: incentive, disincentive, or control) x 2 (frame: gain 
or loss) x 2 (behavior type: prevention or detection) factorial design. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the twelve experimental conditions (see Table 1). 
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Table 1. Breakdown of Condition Composition as a Function of Incentive, Message Frame, and Behavior 
 
 
 
 
Type of Behavior 
 
Incentive x Message Frame Prevention (Sunscreen) Detection (Skin Cancer 
Screening) 
 
 
Incentive (+$30) 
 
 
Gain  
 
 
25 
 
 
25 
Loss 
 
25 
 
25 
 
 
Disincentive (-$30) 
 
Gain 
 
 
25 
 
 
25 
Loss 
 
25 
 
25 
 
 
Information-only 
 
Gain 
 
 
25 
 
25 
Loss 
 
25 25 
3.1.2.3  Independent Variables 
The first variable manipulated was contingency, which was operationalized in three ways: 
incentive, disincentive, and information-only. Some participants received questionnaires 
describing a hypothetical incentive program that would result in reduced student health fees, 
whereas others received questionnaires discussing a possible disincentive program, which would 
result in increased student health fees (but only if the students failed to perform the behavior in 
question). An example of one of these messages (with the contingency manipulation in italics 
and alterations for the disincentive versions in brackets) is ―The University of Pittsburgh is 
always changing the fees that students are charged. Every year, all students at the University of 
Pittsburgh pay a flat Student Health fee amounting to $130. This fee is included in tuition. For 
next year, one possible change that the University Administration is considering is altering this 
policy based on students’ health behavior. One of the new considerations is the use of sunscreen. 
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If you use [do not use] sunscreen regularly, you can apply for and receive a $30 reduction [be 
charged a $30 increase in this fee], which would decrease your yearly tuition costs to $100 
[increase your yearly tuition costs to $160]‖. A control (information-only) condition was not 
exposed to contingency; instead, these messages only encouraged sunscreen or skin cancer 
screening as tools against skin cancer. An example is ―The use of sunscreen has been shown to 
dramatically decrease risk for skin cancer. This is because sunscreen is the most effective way of 
preventing skin cancer, which is the most common cause of cancer related deaths in the US.‖  
Each of these three types of messages (incentive, disincentive, and control) was also 
varied by frame (gain or loss). An example of a gain-oriented, incentive-based message was ―If 
you use sunscreen regularly, you can apply for and receive a $30 reduction on this fee, which 
would decrease your yearly tuition costs to $100.‖ In contrast, a loss-oriented, incentive-based 
message was ―If you do not use sunscreen regularly, you will not be eligible for a $30 reduction 
on this fee, which would decrease your yearly tuition costs to $100.‖ In both cases, the message 
emphasizes an incentive, but the two messages vary on whether the person can gain the incentive 
by performing a behavior or lose it by failing to perform that behavior (see Appendix A).  
Finally, type of behavior was varied among the types of contingency messages. In all 
three contingency conditions (incentive, disincentive, and information-only) half of the messages 
discussed contingency programs that were contingent solely upon prevention behavior 
(sunscreen use), while the other half of the messages focused on detection behavior (receiving 
skin cancer screening from a dermatologist).  
These messages were embedded within a survey containing two questionnaires, and this 
survey was administered to participants in mass testing sessions in a large lecture room. The first 
questionnaire established baseline information about the participants, including current sunscreen 
use, skin cancer screening participantion, risk perceptions of skin cancer, and perceived efficacy 
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of sunscreen use and skin cancer screening. Individual risk was measured by the question: ―What 
do you think your chances are for developing skin cancer in your lifetime?‖ Responses were 
reported on a 1-7 Likert scale, from 1 = extremely unlikely to 7 = extremely likely. Perceptions of 
risk for skin cancer for the average individual were also assessed through one question: ―What 
do you think are the chances of the average person of your age, sex and race developing skin 
cancer in his/her lifetime?‖ again on a 1-7 Likert scale from 1 = extremely unlikely to 7 = 
extremely likely. An additional measure of both individual and average risk was also included, in 
which individuals rated personal and aggregate chances of getting skin cancer on a scale of 0 to 
100 (with 0 = no chance and 100 = certain to happen). Efficacy was assessed both pre- and post-
manipulation through three items for each behavior to determine perceived ease, inconvenience, 
and unpleasantness in sunscreen use and skin cancer screening. Each of these items was, again 
assessed on a 1-7 scale, with 1 = not at all and 7 = very. 
Students then received one of the twelve messages and subsequently completed the 
second questionnaire to measure their post-manipulation responses to the messages they had 
received, including items on their intentions to use sunscreen, intentions to receive receive skin 
cancer screening exams, perceived efficacy of these behaviors, and regulatory fit. Post-
manipulation intentions were assessed through responses to a series of three statements for each 
sunscreen use and skin cancer screening: ―I intend to use sunscreen regularly [get a skin cancer 
screening exam] in the next 6 months,‖ ―How likely is it that you will TRY to use sunscreen 
regularly [get a skin cancer screening exam] in the next 6 months?‖ and ―How likely is it that 
you WILL use sunscreen regularly [get a skin cancer screening exam] in the next 6 months?‖ 
Each participant answered all four of these questions, regardless of the behavior he or she 
received in the contingency-based message. Responses to each of these questions were recorded 
on seven-point scales: from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree for the first question and 
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from 1 = extremely unlikely to 7 = extremely likely for the other two measures. Regulatory fit 
was assessed post-manipulation through two measures of regulatory fit for each behavior type. 
These items measured the fit between the regluatory focus and the means of achieving the goal. 
The first was ―How would you feel if you were able to successfully use sunscreen [get screened 
for skin cancer] in the next 6 months?‖ Regulatory fit was also assessed in a second question: 
―Imagine that you tried and failed to use sunscreen [get a skin cancer screening exam] in the next 
6 months. How would you feel about this?‖ For these questions, responses were recorded on a 
scale from 1 to 19, with 1 = very bad and 19 = very good (Higgins, 2000). The higher the value 
of the response, the higher the fit between the focus of the person (promotion or prevention) and 
the means toward achieving the goal state. 
3.1.3 Results 
3.1.3.1  Demographic Information  
Approximately half (53%) of participants classified their level of sun exposure as either 
somewhat or very high. Meanwhile, almost half of the participants (45%) indicated that they 
currently do not use sunscreen SPF 15 or higher, whereas only 36% reported regular sunscreen 
use. Approximately three-quarters (74%) reported that they do not see a dermatologist regularly 
for skin cancer screening examinations, whereas 24% do see a dermatologist regularly for any 
reason. Still, the majority of participants (63.3%) reported that they get sunburned 
―occasionally,‖ ―rarely,‖ or ―never.‖ More than half reported that they used sunless 
tanner/tanning lotion and tanning salons ―rarely‖ or never‖ (67% and 66%, respectively). The 
majority of the participants were White or Caucasian (n = 248), and had insurance, either on 
their own or through their parents (n = 293). 
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3.1.3.2  Analytic Overview 
Univariate analyses based on the 3 x 2 x 2 factorial design showed no interactions among any of 
the target variables for intentions and regulatory fit, nor did they reveal any main effects for 
frame or type of behavior (prevention vs. detection). The lack of effects of contingency may 
have resulted from a reduction in the between-groups variance introduced by having a control 
group. Consequently, a set of 2 (contingency) x 2 (message frame) ANOVAs were conducted to 
analyze the effects of type of contingency within the two message frame conditions. Data from 
participants who received information-only messages were removed and used in additional 
univariate analyses with the fixed factors of frame and type of behavior. No significant 
interactions emerged from these analyses, but several significant main effects were found.  
3.1.3.3  Efficacy 
With Cronbach’s  = .77 and .70 for the three items measuring perceived efficacy of sunscreen 
use and skin cancer screening, respectively, (each on a scale from 1-7), responses to the efficacy 
questions were summed to create two variables for analysis: sunscreen efficacy and skin cancer 
screening, each on a new scale from 1 to 21. To examine if contingency and frame had a 
differential impact on perceived efficacy for sunscreen use and screening, univariate analyses 
were conducted with these variables, controlling for the type of the behavior in the message (so 
that only individuals who received a message about sunscreen use were included in analyses 
about sunscreen intentions and vice-versa). No interactions and almost no significant effects 
were found for any of the variables, even when the type of behavior in the manipulation message 
was matched with the behavior being examined in the analyses (sunscreen message for sunscreen 
efficacy analyses, screening message for screening efficacy analyses). Only when the 
information-only condition was excluded from the analyses did contingency have a significant 
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effect on perceived efficacy among those who received skin cancer screening messages (F(1, 57) 
= 4.04, p  < .05), with disincentives resulting in higher perceptions of efficacy (M = 10.72, SD = 
3.87) than incentives (M = 9.15, SD = 3.65). 
3.1.3.4  Intentions [Hypotheses 1 and 2] 
Post-manipulation items for intentions to use sunscreen or receive a skin cancer exam were 
highly reliable (Cronbach’s  = .92 and .95, respectively) and thus were collapsed into two 
variables by summing the responses: sunscreen intentions and skin cancer screening intentions. 
Univariate analyses were then conducted, again controlling for the type of the behavior in the 
message (so that only individuals who received a message about sunscreen use were included in 
analyses about sunscreen intentions, etc.). Additionally, the information-only condition was 
omitted for the following analyses to reduce between-groups variance that this condition may 
have introduced and clarify the differential effects of incentives vs. disincentives. For sunscreen 
intentions, no significant effects occurred across any of the incentive and disincentive conditions 
(F(1, 98) = .05, p = .83). Univariate analyses of skin cancer screening intentions, however, 
showed a main effect of contingency (F(1, 98) = 5.38, p < .05) (see Table 2) when the 
information-only condition was excluded from the analyses, such that incentives increased 
intentions to receive skin cancer screening exams (M = 9.46, SD = 5.36) better than disincentives 
(M = 7.16, SD = 4.53). Separate analyses were also conducted to analyze the means of the 
controls within these two contingency conditions, which were merely the reported intentions of 
individuals about their intentions to perform the behavior about which they did not receive a 
message. For example, if a participant received a sunscreen message, his/her responses on skin 
cancer screening intentions were recorded as the control for sunscreen intentions. As intended, 
these analyses showed no significant effects for either behavior.  
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Post hoc tests for contingency between all three contingency groups, including the 
information-only condition, again showed no significant difference in intentions for either 
sunscreen use or skin cancer screening, but confirmed the significance of the effects of 
incentives vs. disincentives in the skin cancer screening condition. 
Table 2. Intentions to Receive Skin Cancer Screening as a Function of Contingency and Behavior 
 
 
Contingency 
Behavior Type in Message 
Sunscreen Use (Control) Skin Cancer Screening 
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
 
Incentive 
 
13.66 
 
5.09 
 
9.46* 
 
5.36 
     
Disincentive 14.26 5.21 7.16* 4.53 
     
Information-only 15.16 4.85 7.86 4.99 
(Control) denotes that the behavior in message is irrelevant to behavior target of question on intentions. 
Scale for combined intentions items: 1 = strongly disagree [do not intend to perform behavior] to 21 = strongly 
agree [intend to perform behavior]. 
* Denotes a significant difference at the p < .05 level (F(1, 98) = 5.38, p < .05). 
3.1.3.5 Regulatory Focus [Hypothesis 3] 
Due to the nature of the experiment, participants answered both regulatory fit questions (―How 
would you feel if you were able to successfully use sunscreen [get screened] in the next six 
months?‖ and ―Imagine that you tried and failed to use sunscreen [get a skin cancer screening 
exam] in the next six months. How would you feel about this?‖) for both sunscreen use and skin 
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cancer screening, regardless of which behavior had been targeted in the message they received. 
As a result, half of the answers recorded by participants on regulatory focus items did not match 
the behavior in the message that they received. These answers served as controls. In other words, 
for each of the four items on regulatory fit, two questions per participant (one about successfully 
performing the behavior and one about failing to do so) were control measures and two actually 
assessed regulatory fit in relation to the behavior that had been discussed in the contingency 
message received during the manipulation. Individual univariate analyses were conducted for 
both the matched items (in which the behavior received in the message corresponded with the 
projected response to success or failure being assessed by the regulatory focus question) and 
unmatched items (in which opposite behaviors appeared in the message and regulatory focus 
question) for both types of regulatory focus items (see Tables 3 and 4). 
Results of the successful sunscreen use regulatory fit item that was matched on behavior 
approached significance for contingency (including the information only condition) (F(2, 147) = 
2.80, p = .06). After taking out the information-only condition to examine the relationship 
between disincentives and incentives, the relationship was significant, with incentives resulting 
in significantly higher reports of anticipated positive affect in regards to using sunscreen than 
disincentives (F(1, 98) = 4.37, p = .04) (see Table 3). As expected, control regulatory focus items 
(not matched on behavior) revealed no significant results, either when all three types of 
incentives (including the information-only condition) were included in the analyses (F(2, 146) = 
.28, p = .76), or when incentives and disincentives were compared alone (F(1, 97) = .01, p = .91). 
Univariate analyses for the matched questions discussing failure to use sunscreen also showed no 
significance for the effect of contingency when all three conditions were compared, (F(2, 147) = 
2.0, p = .15), and even when the information-only condition was not included in the analyses 
(F(1, 98) = 2.37, p = .13). Non-matched failure to use sunscreen questions, however did 
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approach significance for incentives, (F(1, 96) = 3.00, p = .09), but not when the information-
only condition was included in the analyses (F(2, 145) = 2.03, p = .14). 
Table 3. Future Sunscreen Use Goals as a Function of Contingency and Regulatory Focus. 
 
 
Contingency 
Orientation 
Perform Behavior  Fail to Perform Behavior 
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
 
Incentive 
 
 
   
        Sunscreen 16.18* 3.49 9.36 4.47 
        Screening (c) 15.86 3.25 9.25 2.78 
     
Disincentive     
        Sunscreen 14.64* 3.87 8.14 3.39 
        Screening (c) 15.78 3.31 8.06 3.90 
     
Information-only     
        Sunscreen 16.00 3.30 7.96 3.60 
        Screening (c) 16.22 2.86 7.88 4.09 
(c) = control, signifying that the behavior in message irrelevant to behavior target in question. 
* Denotes a significant difference at the p < .05 level (F(1, 98) = 4.37, p < .05). 
Scale for regulatory fit items (Tables 3 and 4): 1 = very bad to 19 = very good. 
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Among the regulatory fit questions on skin cancer screening (see Table 4), responses 
about successful screening were significant when the behavior in the question was matched with 
the behavior discussed in the message, but only when comparing incentives with disincentives 
(F(1, 96) = 4.64, p = .03), and not when the information-only condition was included in the 
analyses (F(2, 145) = 2.71, p = .07). Paradoxically, the non-matched or control questions on 
successful screening did reach significance, both when all three contingency groups were 
incorporated in the analyses (F(2, 147) = 3.51, p = .03), and when incentives and disincentives 
were compared alone (F(1, 98) = 4.59, p = .04). 
Finally, univariate analyses were conducted on matched and non-matched responses to 
the question concerning the failure to receive skin cancer screening. Matched responses did not 
demonstrate significant differences when all three contingency conditions were included in the 
analyses (F(2, 145) = .22, p = .81), or when only incentives and disincentives were compared 
(F(1, 96) = .45, p  = .50). Similarly, analyses on the non-matched items did not reach 
significance (F(2, 147) = .57, p = .57), even when the information-only condition was excluded 
(F(1, 98) = .41, p  =  .53).  
3.1.3.6 Risk Perceptions [Hypothesis 4] 
Results showed that participants estimated their risk for skin cancer (M = 4.11, SD = 1.41) to be 
lower than the average person’s risk (M = 4.55, SD = 1.14), t(299) = 5.22, p < .0001). An 
additional t-test was then conducted on the second set of measures of perceived individual and 
average risk (on a percentage scale). Again, perceived personal risk for skin cancer (M = 41.01, 
SD = 24.44) was lower than the perceived risk of skin cancer for the average person (M = 47.88, 
SD = 21.14) and this difference was significant (t(299) = 5.41, p < .0001). Although they were 
correlated with intentions to use sunscreen (r(298) = .13, p < .05) and intentions to receive skin 
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cancer screening (r(298) = .24, p < .01), perceptions of risk did not appear to co-vary with or 
moderate the effects of contingency when controlled for in univariate analyses. Thus, in contrast 
to what was hypothesized [4], type of contingency did not interact with baseline risk perceptions. 
Table 4. Future Skin Cancer Screening Goals as a Function of Contingency and Regulatory Focus. 
 
 
Contingency 
Orientation 
Perform Behavior     Fail to Perform Behavior 
Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation 
 
Incentive 
    
        Sunscreen (c) 15.50* 3.41 8.76 3.87 
        Screening  15.63** 3.37 8.42 3.14 
     
Disincentive     
     Sunscreen (c) 14.08* 3.21 9.16 2.16 
    Screening  14.02** 3.96 8.82 2.79 
     
Information-only     
     Sunscreen (c) 15.62* 3.07 8.50 3.11 
     Screening  15.44 3.89 8.48 3.82 
(c) = control, signifying that the behavior in message irrelevant to behavior target in question. 
* Denotes a significant difference at the p < .05 level (F(2, 147) = 3.51, p < .05). 
**Denotes a significant difference at the p < .05 level (F(1, 96) = 4.64, p < .05). 
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3.1.4 Experiment 1: Discussion 
Based on these data, only a few of the initial hypotheses were supported. No interactions were 
found between contingency and frame or type of behavior on any of the dependent measures, 
including efficacy, intentions, or regulatory fit items. Type of behavior did not engender any 
significant effects in any condition, which is perhaps to be expected, given the fact that the only 
time one behavior was emphasized over another was in the short contingency-based message. 
For the rest of the questionnaire, participants were asked equally often about their sunscreen use 
as they were about their skin cancer screening, which may have rendered any mention of one 
behavior in the message irrelevant, especially with all of the other information in the message. 
Although this study failed to link the message framing literature to contingency, several 
of the contingency manipulations did achieve significance. Among the group of participants that 
received contingency-based messages on skin cancer screening, incentives were significantly 
more effective at promoting subsequent intentions to undergo screening exams than 
disincentives. This finding was actually the opposite of what was predicted (that inherently 
detection behaviors would be best promoted by disincentives). Consequently, these results 
suggest that contingency may be more complex than just a reoperationalization of message 
framing. Incentives, which focus on gains, were shown to best promote a detection behavior in 
this experiment, whereas the research on the construct of message framing has consistently 
shown that messages focusing on losses most effectively promote detection behaviors (Rothman 
et al., 1997; Rothman et al., 2006).  
That skin cancer screening, and not sunscreen use, was affected by contingency is also 
interesting. Primarily recommended for men and women over 40 (Shah, et al., 2007; Shah, Zhu, 
Palmer & Wu, 2007), skin cancer screening was unlikely to be very high for this sample. Indeed, 
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only about a quarter (26%) of participants reported that they regularly see a dermatologist, 
whereas a higher percentage (36%) reported regular sunscreen use. However, incentives were 
significantly more effective in promoting intentions to receive skin cancer screening, whereas 
none of the contingency variables had any significant impact on increasing intentions for 
sunscreen. Given these observations, it could be possible that contingency has differential effects 
on behaviors in terms of the frequency with which they are performed. Perhaps incentives are 
more effective at promoting new behaviors, rather than behaviors that people already perform 
regularly. This would explain the observed effectiveness of contingency in the short term in 
promoting uptake of a variety of health behaviors and the complexity of understanding of 
contingency over the long run (Kane et al., 2004).  
 The regulatory fit measures provided the most interesting results. For the item on 
successful sunscreen use, contingency resulted in significantly different levels of anticipated 
satisfaction, with incentives engendering greater predictions of happiness for successful use than 
disincentives. This makes sense, because incentives would add to the benefit incurred. If the 
healthcare program discussed in the messages in this experiment actually existed, individuals 
who would like to increase their sunscreen use would not only fulfill their goals, thereby 
approaching their ideal selves, but also receive external rewards. More significantly, the 
disincentive condition projected much lower levels of anticipated satisfaction with successful 
sunscreen use than even the information-only condition, which received no contingency.  
Additionally, on the skin cancer screening items for regulatory fit, two main effects were 
observed, both regarding the successful completion item. Again, individuals asked how they 
would feel if they were able to successfully receive a skin cancer screening exam reported higher 
anticipated satisfaction when they received incentives than disincentives. Unlike the successful 
sunscreen use question, however, the effects of contingency were also significant among those 
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who received sunscreen messages (thereby serving as the control on behavior in this question), 
and this significant effect held across all three contingency conditions. Interestingly enough, 
although there were significant differences between the three conditions, the information-only 
condition produced the highest level of anticipated satisfaction, followed by incentive and 
disincentive, respectively. These findings do support the hypothesis that successful completion 
of a behavior would be more appreciated by individuals who received incentives in the health 
messages than by individuals facing disincentives. 
A final finding to note is that, although perceived risk did not appear to co-vary with or 
influence the effects of contingency when controlled for in univariate analyses, t-tests on the risk 
measures replicated a general finding in the social psychological literature that the majority of 
people perceive their risk to be lower than that of the average person. This unrealistic optimism 
has been demonstrated for a variety of health risks, including skin cancer (Clarke, Williams, & 
Arthey, 1997), and diminished perceptions of the hazard inherent in risk behavior is especially 
low among young adults (Cohn, MacFarlane, Yanez, & Imai, 1995).  
 These results illuminate several directions for future studies on contingency. First, 
measures on perceived barriers to and attitudes toward screening should be included. Both of 
these items were not assessed in this study, but would be valuable in any future analyses of 
screening. Perceived barriers have especially been shown to influence screening behavior (Rawl 
et al., 2001; Janz, Wren, Schottenfeld & Guire, 2003). Because regulatory fit was the most 
successful dependent measure, future studies should also continue to examine regulatory focus to 
determine if there are any further interactions with contingency. Indeed, ―One explanation, then, 
for incentives’ [contingency’s] inconsistent effects on performance may be their lack of 
congruence with participants’ goals or needs‖ (Shah et al., 1998, p. 285).  
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One possible problem with the design of this study was that no measure of family history 
was included in the questionnaires. This may have influenced participants’ preexisting beliefs 
and attitudes toward skin cancer, because it has been estimated that as much as 94% of families 
stricken by melanoma have regular conversations about skin cancer screening (Hay et al., 2005). 
If family history independently influences skin cancer screening, that would have been an 
important variable for which to control. Another potentially important variable is participants’ 
preexisting beliefs of self-efficacy, or their ability to prevent skin cancer. If they believed they 
can prevent it, they may not have been as influenced by disincentives, because the disincentives 
may not have been as threatening. Again, this was not incorporated in the dependent measures.  
An additional limitation was that the same monetary values were used for both incentive 
and disincentive messages. Incentive messages may be effective at different monetary amounts 
than disincentives; thus, the amounts used for each construct in this study may have been higher 
or lower than they needed to be. In other words, the amount used in all messages ($30) may have 
resulted in a more effective message of one type of contingency over another, because it may be 
the case that incentives are promoted at lower monetary amounts than disincentives, or vice 
versa. For example, disincentive messages may only be effective at amounts of $40 or greater, 
whereas a $30 reward would suffice for an effective incentive message. Indeed, this would 
explain why the opposite of what was predicted in the hypotheses was observed. Perhaps 
disincentives best promote screening, but only when the value of the disincentive is higher than 
the one used in this study. Further analysis of contingency should therefore first determine if 
incentives and disincentives promote screening at the same or at different monetary values.  
Any possible interactions that do exist between the independent variables of frame, type 
of behavior, and contingency may have also been muddled by the nature of the messages. 
Because so many variables were manipulated in such a short time, there may have been an 
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attentional bias in favor of the most tangible aspect of the message: the monetary incentive. This 
would explain the polarization of the significant effects for only the contingency variable and 
may have obscured or obfuscated any effects of message framing or type of behavior. Future 
studies on contingency should therefore simplify incentive and disincentive messages. One way 
to do this is to vary the messages only by contingency, and not by frame or behavior type. Given 
that no interactions between contingency and either frame or behavior type were found in this 
study, these constructs should not be varied in future contingency messages, in order to eliminate 
attentional bias and distractions within the message.  
Finally, contingency messages must be assessed among other populations to uncover 
differential responses to contingency among different age groups. Because skin cancer screening 
is officially recommended for individuals over 40 (Shah, et al., 2007; Shah, Zhu, Palmer & Wu, 
2007), this student population may have found such an intervention personally irrelevant due to 
age, regardless of contingency. Older populations for whom cancer screening in general is more 
commonly recommended may respond differently to contingency messages, simply because of 
their recognition of the necessity to receive screening at their age.  
Due to this possible irrelevance of the skin cancer screening paradigm for the sample of 
this study—undergraduate students—, the first step in further inquiry was to assess the effects of 
contingency among populations for whom cancer screening is a relevant behavior.   
3.2 STUDY 2: COMMUNITY SAMPLE 
Because of the mixed results of the first experiment, a second questionnaire was incorporated 
into an ongoing study on colorectal cancer screening study—this time with the target population 
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for colorectal cancer screening (individuals ages 50 and older). The objective was to collect pilot 
data that could address some of the shortcomings of and provide answers to some of the 
questions that arose regarding the design of the first experiment. Specifically, in that experiment, 
no distinction was made between incentives and disincentives in terms of the monetary amount 
used in the messages. The same dollar value was used for all contingency messages. Yet the 
amount of the incentive at which a message is most persuasive may differ from the optimal 
amount for a disincentive. Consequently, these questionnaires were administered to determine if 
there is a difference in the amount needed for an incentive to be effective as a motivational tool 
and the amount needed for a disincentive to be effective. One additional hypothesis derived from 
the literature review regarding the relationship between risk perceptions and contingency was 
also examined. 
3.2.1 Hypotheses 
First, [1] incentives were predicted to be more effective than disincentives at promoting 
screening, both when the incentives were related to co-payments and when they were related to 
treatment costs. This was assessed through a series of four contingency scenario items. Two 
scenarios presented a situation in which screening would result in a reduction in monthly co-
payments (incentive-screening) or in future medical costs, should the individual develop cancer 
(incentive-treatment). The other two scenarios presented the converse: that a failure to screen 
would result in an increase in monthly co-payments (disincentive-screening) or future medical 
costs (disincentive-treatment). For incentives to be more effective than disincentive in this 
context, therefore, participants would have to respond that it would take less of a decrease in 
payments (and thus smaller incentives) for them to want to get screened than it would take of a 
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potential increase in insurance costs (meaning that the disincentives selected would have to be of 
higher monetary amounts). This prediction was based on the success of incentives over 
disincentives in promoting intentions for screening behavior in the previous experiment.  
Additionally, [2] participants with low perceived risk were expected to express greater 
desire to screen for smaller positive incentives in response to gain-framed/incentive messages, as 
they may view screening as more of a prevention behavior. Because cancer screening is more 
generally perceived as an effective detection behavior, however, disincentives, were expected to 
be especially moderated by risk feedback, such that participants with the highest risk would be 
threatened by the smallest punishments.  
3.2.2 Method 
3.2.2.1 Participants 
Eight male and female residents of Allegheny County (N = 8) between the ages of 50-75 
comprised this sample. Participants were recruited through the University Center for Social and 
Urban Research (UCSUR), a recruiting service at the University of Pittsburgh. Participants were 
contacted from UCSUR’s call list databases and asked basic eligibility questions. Eligible 
participants were then referred to the Social and Health Psychology Laboratory, which is running 
the larger study into which the questionnaires for this study were included. Criteria for eligibility 
were that participants could never have undergone colorectal cancer screening and could never 
have had any type of cancer. This was done to ensure that the sample was representative of the 
target population for the legislation and programs advocating colorectal cancer screening in 
terms of age and lack of screening history. 
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3.2.2.2 Procedure 
Based on the literature review, questionnaires aimed at illuminating interactions among 
contingency, risk perceptions, and gain-and loss-framed messages were developed (see 
Appendices B and C). These questionnaires were added to a larger ongoing experiment about 
colorectal cancer screening, which was comprised of a one hour baseline interview conducted via 
telephone, including measures assessing family history, awareness of screening tests, and risk 
perceptions (see Appendix B) and a subsequent one hour lab session, during which the 
participants were given personalized risk information from the Harvard Risk Index (Colditz et 
al., 2005). At the end of the lab session, participants in the control condition for the experiment, 
who therefore had not received any experimental manipulation, were presented with four 
hypothetical situations concerning contingency. 
In order to collect data on the monetary amounts that would be effective in incentive-
based vs. disincentive-based interventions, one open-ended question [1] and four hypothetical 
contingency scenarios were developed. Two presented screening interventions (one gain-framed 
and incentive-based [4], and one loss-framed and disincentive-based [2]), and two scenarios had 
interventions related to treatment (one gain-framed and incentive-based [5], and one loss-framed 
and disincentive-based [3]) (see Appendix C). Incentive-based messages were presented in gain 
but not loss frames and disincentives were paired exclusively with loss-frames. This was done 
because incentives are intuitively gain-framed, as this is how they are found in actual messages, 
such as in communications by consumer-directed health providers. Likewise, disincentive 
messages are typically loss-framed in actual communications, as in the German disincentive-
based screening law. Given that no interactions were found between frame and contingency in 
the previous experiment, contingency messages were constructed to emulate realistic scenarios 
for two reasons: first, with the hope of generating results with more generalizability to current 
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interventions, and second, to reduce the possibility for confusion among participants. Mirroring 
current legislation in hypothetical questions made the questions very detailed, and further 
complicating the messages by varying frame in ways that are counter-intuitive and artificial was 
deemed superfluous for the aim of this pilot study. Especially due to the within-groups design 
and the fact that participants received these questionnaires after an hour-long experiment, the 
questions were designed to be as concise and realistic as possible.  
Incentive-based scenarios were succeeded by the question: ―How much of an decrease in 
your monthly payments would this insurance plan have to propose for you to get screened for 
CRC now?‖ whereas loss-frame/disincentive-based scenarios were followed by the question: 
―How much of a increase in your monthly payments would this insurance plan have to propose 
for you to get screened for CRC now?‖ Scales for both disincentive scenarios ranged from 1 = 
―Less than $10 per month‖ to 7 = ―Greater than $100 per month.‖ For the incentive-based 
screening item, the scale also ranged from 1 = ―Less than $10 per month‖ to 7 = ―Greater than 
$100 per month.‖ For all three of these questions, the response ―I would not get screened‖ was 
coded as 8. The scale for the gain-framed treatment item, however, ranged from 1 = ―1900 co-
pay per month on future cancer treatment‖ to 5 = ―$100 co-pay per month,‖ with 6 = ―I would 
not get screened.‖ Incentive treatment items were constructed differently for two reasons. 
Although the contingency screening questions were modeled after consumer health care 
communications, the treatment items were designed with the intention of emulating the construct 
of the German legislation, in which the use of contingency concerns treatment payments. So, the 
idea was to develop both an incentive and disincentive version of this question. As a result, the 
scales had to be changed, because the difference between answer choices ranging from $10-$100 
dollar increases or decreases on cancer treatment payments would be too marginally insignificant 
in proportion to the actual costs of these treatments.  
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Though the incentive treatment item was changed accordingly, the scale and focus used 
in the disincentive treatment item were kept the same as for the screening questions in the end. 
This was done, first, because the German construction of the disincentive message is unrealistic 
for US healthcare consumers. In Germany, healthcare is universal and federally controlled, 
which provides more room for uncontested action. Due to the privatized nature of the US 
healthcare system, Americans with such a policy would merely change providers. Thus, it was 
feared that including an item that explicitly addressed a fiscal punishment on cancer treatment 
would not elicit realistic responses. Increasing one’s insurance payments after their liability 
increases is, however, a common notion in US culture—for example, if one gets into too many 
car accidents, one is subsequently subject to paying more to remain insured. It is even 
conceivable that health insurance providers, especially in the consumer directed healthcare 
sector, that incentivize preventive health behavior could incorporate such a disincentive construct 
into their plans, whereas a punishment on cancer treatment costs would be a risky business 
endeavor, given free market competition. Additionally, using the same scale as the screening 
questions for the disincentive treatment scenario allowed for potential subsequent statistical 
comparison within the disincentive items, in order to examine whether the focus of a 
contingency question, either screening or treatment upon being diagnosed with cancer, would 
affect responses to it. Thus, the scale and construction of the incentive treatment, but not the 
disincentive treatment question was altered. Finally, the order of the contingency questions was 
randomized according to a random number generator before the questionnaires were given to the 
participants, in order to counteract any possible order effects arising from the sequence in which 
the incentive and disincentive messages were presented. 
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3.2.3 Results 
3.2.3.1 Demographics 
This study is part of a larger experiment that is ongoing and not yet complete. Only eight 
participants have completed the questionnaires. Of these eight, seven identified as White, one as 
Black, and one declined to answer in the baseline interview. Six reported that they currently had 
some kind of insurance. The average age of these participants was 58.50 (SD = 4.54).   
3.2.3.2 Contingency items 
In response to the open-ended incentive question [1], in which participants were asked how 
much they would have to be paid to get screened in the next two weeks, responses ranged 
drastically, from the ―cost of the test‖ to $0 to $5000 (M = 721.88, SD = 1736.30).  
Means were then calculated for each contingency scenario (see Figure 5 on the next 
page). For the disincentive treatment item [3] the reported effective monetary amount was lower 
(M = 2.25, SD = 2.05) than for any of the other scenarios, whereas the incentive treatment [5] 
item engendered the highest mean response (M = 3.75, SD = 1.91). The incentive screening [4] 
scenario resulted in the second highest mean response (M = 2.75, SD = 1.98), and the 
disincentive screening item [2] elicited the second lowest mean response (M = 2.62, SD = 2.20). 
Paired samples t-tests revealed no significant differences between the means of the 
responses for the disincentive screening and disincentive treatment items (t(7) = 1.43, p = .20). 
When responses for the incentive and disincentive screening items were compared, means again 
did not differ significantly (t(7) = -.26, p = .80). Because the differences between the means of 
the disincentive questions are in the right direction, these results may become significant with a 
larger sample size. If so, this would suggest that the focus of contingency (either on screening or 
 50 
on treatment) may impact responses to such messages, at least for disincentives. This would 
make sense, given that an individual paying for cancer treatment would be more sensitive to 
medical costs, and would likely act more readily (to smaller monetary amounts) to avoid 
additional fiscal disincentives. Additionally, if the difference between the means of the incentive 
and disincentive screening items reached significance with a larger sample size, this would fail to 
support the hypothesis, as it would mean that participants expressed that they would be screened 
only in response to incentives of greater value (higher monetary amounts). This would, however, 
support the framing literature, which asserts that screening (a detection behavior) is more 
effectively promoted among individuals when they are faced with a loss as the alternative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean reported monetary values for effective contingency interventions as a function of type of 
intervention and behavior 
Z-scores were then calculated for correlational analyses of all four questions. Significant 
correlations were found among all of the contingency items, except for the incentive treatment 
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item. Disincentive screening responses were not only positively correlated with disincentive 
treatment responses (r(6) = .94, p < .001), but also with incentive screening responses (r(6) = 
.80, p < .05). Incentive screening responses were also significantly correlated with disincentive 
treatment responses (r(6) = .86, p < .01). Incentive treatment responses, however, were not 
significantly correlated with responses to the incentive screening (r(6) = .47, p = .24), 
disincentive screening (r(6) = .59, p = .13), or disincentive treatment (r(6) = .53, p = .18) items. 
That the responses to the disincentive screening, disincentive treatment, and incentive screening 
questions were highly significant suggests that individuals tend to respond similarly to both of 
these types of contingency. Additionally, the lack of a significant correlation between responses 
to the incentive treatment scenario and any of the other items may be suggestive of the fact that 
individuals respond differentially to situations in which the focus of contingency is explicitly 
related to cancer treatment costs, rather than overall insurance payments. Despite the lack of 
significance, however, correlations were high across all conditions, and may become significant 
even for the incentive treatment item with a larger sample size. 
3.2.3.3 Risk Perceptions 
Correlational analyses were then conducted to determine relationships between participants’ 
perceived risk and their responses to the contingency scenarios. Results revealed that 
participants’ risk perceptions were not significantly correlated with their responses to the 
incentive screening (r(6) = -.20, p = .64), incentive treatment (r(6) = .22, p = .60), disincentive 
screening (r(6) = -.34, p = .41), or disincentive treatment (r(6) = -.38, p = .36) scenarios. Though 
the correlations were not significant, they were still large enough to indicate trends that may 
become significant with more participants. Furthermore, three of the four scenarios revealed a 
negative relationship with perceived risk. Correlations tended more towards significance for the 
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treatment items than their screening counterparts, and results for both disincentive items 
approached significance more closely than the results for the incentive items. With a larger 
sample size, these analyses may reach significance, especially for the disincentive items. Such 
findings would support the hypothesis that the higher the risk perceptions, the lower the 
monetary value it would take for a disincentive to be effective, especially when cancer treatment 
is addressed in the message.  
3.2.4 Study 2: Discussion 
None of the hypotheses was supported in this pilot study. Incentives were no more likely than 
disincentives to encourage screening at lower amounts. In fact, responses to all contingency 
scenarios except for the treatment incentive item were highly related, based on the positive 
correlations between the responses to three of the four contingency questions. According to these 
correlations, individuals who selected lower amounts for the incentive questions, were just as 
likely to report that they would get screened in response to lower valued disincentives. This is 
not only contradictory to the results of the previous study among an undergraduate sample in 
which incentives were more likely than disincentives to promote intentions to undergo a skin 
cancer screening exam, but also counter to the framing literature, according to which people tend 
to be more sensitive to facing potential losses than accruing potential gains when presented with 
the option of performing detection behaviors (Rothman et al., 2006), because people are risk 
averse (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981). Trends toward significance, however, suggested that the 
latter hypothesis may receive some support if the size of the sample were increased.  
Risk perceptions were also not significantly correlated with responses to the contingency 
items, though the beginnings of possible trends were observed. Treatment-focused items tended 
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toward significance more than the screening items for both incentives and disincentives. 
Analyses also revealed that the disincentive items as a whole approached significance more 
closely than either incentive item. In a larger sample, these results might reach significance and 
thereby provide support for the idea that disincentives more effectively promote screening (at 
lower monetary values) when coupled with higher risk perceptions. Finally, no conclusions could 
be drawn from the open-ended incentive question due to the wide range of responses. 
One interesting point is that all of the scenario questions included among the answer 
choices the response: ―I would not get screened.‖ Interestingly, only one participant selected this 
item at all, and only once: for the incentive treatment item. That all other participants selected 
from among the remaining answer choices is suggestive of the fact that contingency across the 
board would promote the adoption of cancer screening behavior, though this is merely 
speculative. It may be the case that individuals refuse screening more readily in response to 
scenarios in which the incentive may only be gained on a conditional basis—for example, if the 
participant developed cancer. A larger sample would be needed to confirm this hypothesis.  
Some of the limitations to this pilot included most obviously the small sample size, which 
limits generalizability, as well as randomization problems. The small sample size of this study 
certainly limits the extent to which general conclusions about contingency can be drawn from the 
results. However, in light of the fact that this study was conducted to collect pilot data, it did 
fulfill its purpose in providing some results for comparison, though none of the t-tests was 
significant, and did reveal some interesting correlations. Secondly, although the contingency 
items were randomized, the majority of the questionnaires were answered in the order in which 
they are listed in Appendix C. This occurred because of the small number of participants coupled 
with the fact that some of the participants who had been assigned numbers failed to answer the 
contingency questionnaire. Because these questions were administered at the end of the lab 
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session, in a few cases, participants to whom an order for the items had been assigned expressed 
urgency to leave and did not complete the questionnaires. However, the significant correlations 
among all questions except for the incentive treatment item suggests that the order of 
contingency construct that participants received was unlikely to have altered their responses. 
Overall, the results obtained from this pilot study necessitated further inquiry and, above all, a 
larger data set to provide clarification for the contradictory findings. 
3.3 STUDY 3: CONTINGENCY WITH COMMUNITY SAMPLE 
To further examine the pilot data collected on the contingency items from the previous 
community sample study and to further examine the most promising finding from the first 
study—that of the interaction between contingency and regulatory focus—, a questionnaire was 
developed for use as an online survey. This questionnaire comprised items from both the first 
study—adapted for the colorectal cancer screening population—and items from the second (see 
Appendix D). From the first study, questions addressing regulatory fit and perceived efficacy for 
colorectal cancer screening were selected, due to the interesting results on these dimensions 
among the undergraduate sample. The aim was to assess whether the findings would hold in an 
older population. From the pilot study, the contingency items were incorporated. Additionally, 
questions regarding the role and effectiveness of insurance and government were included to 
assess attitudes about third party involvement in facilitating cancer screening.  
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3.3.1 Hypotheses 
First, attitudes toward insurance and government regarding colorectal cancer screening and 
treatment were expected to be negative, because neither the federal government nor the state of 
Pennsylvania had any legislation related to encouraging screening through 2008.  
Hypotheses of responses to contingency were also re-examined in this experiment, due to 
the limited data collected in the pilot experiment. Specifically, disincentives were predicted to be 
more effective than incentives at promoting screening, both for co-payments and medical costs 
based on speculation about trends observed in the previous analyses of the pilot data. Though 
high correlations but no significant differences had been found between responses to the 
incentive screening and both disincentive items in the previous study, it was expected that more 
significant variance in responses, even within groups, would be observed in a larger sample.  
Since regulatory focus items were included in the survey after the contingency scenarios, 
it was predicted that responses to these questions would be telling of an effect of incentives. In 
particular, participants were expected to express greater satisfaction in response to the possibility 
of successfully getting screened in the next six months than dissatisfaction for failing to get 
screened. This is based on the findings of the experiment with the undergraduate sample in 
conjunction with the results of the pilot study. For both the prevention and detection behaviors in 
the first experiment, differences in regulatory fit arose only on items measuring perceived 
satisfaction at the prospect of successfully performing the behavior. Specifically, the participants 
exposed to incentives expressed greater satisfaction at the prospect of successfully performing 
the targeted behavior than those who received disincentive messages for both prevention and 
detection behaviors. Contingency did not result in significant differences in responses to any 
regulatory fit items regarding response to failure at completing the target behavior. Thus, perhaps 
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it is the effect of incentives to engender a promotion-focus, or, in other words, to promote 
satisfaction with or at least direct attention to the positive aspects of completing the targeted 
behavior and thereby moving toward the ideal self.  
Yet in the pilot community sample study, both incentives and disincentives encouraged 
screening at low amounts (between $10 and $20 per month), which were not significantly 
different, but were positively correlated. Unlike the younger population, among whom 
differences in responses to incentives versus disincentives had been found, both types of 
contingency engendered similar responses among older participants. Given the common 
responses to both incentives and disincentives by the older population, contingency as a whole 
may have a common effect with regard to regulatory focus for such populations as well. 
Whether performing a behavior would result in the reception of rewards or the avoidance 
of a punishment, performing the behavior itself might be perceived as more appealing when 
contingency is made salient, especially among older populations, as contingency may heighten 
focus on procuring positive outcomes by screening (promotion focus) rather than engender 
concern with negative outcomes (prevention focus). This would explain why significant 
differences were observed only in the successful behavior completion items and in both the 
matched (experimental) and non-matched (control) groups for the screening items with the 
undergraduate sample, as well as why responses to both incentive and disincentive items in the 
community sample study were so highly correlated. Participants in this study were therefore 
expected to show a preference for performing the behavior, because an approach strategy of 
completing the behavior would best match a promotion focus.  
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3.3.2 Method 
3.3.2.1 Participants 
Participants were male and female volunteers (N = 25) over the age of 50. Compensation for 
completing the study was the possibility of gaining further information on colorectal cancer and 
screening tests for it. 
3.3.2.2 Procedure 
The survey was uploaded to a secure, subscription-based online program 
(www.surveymonkey.com) designed for academic experimental use, which was set so that no 
identifying information or IP addresses would be recorded. It was then posted as links on 
Craigslist under the ―volunteers‖ section and on the SPSP (Society for Personality and Social 
Psychology) listserv. Participants were able to become involved in the study by clicking on the 
link and answering a required eligibility question regarding age—which was included so that 
responses from ineligible individuals younger than 50 could later be eliminated from analyses—
and then were able to complete the full questionnaire.  
The survey was constructed such that participants were first asked about their attitudes 
toward the effectiveness of both health insurance and government in encouraging preventive 
colorectal cancer screening. Participants rated this coverage on a scale from 1 to 4, with 1 = very 
good, and 4 = very bad, and a final option ―Don’t know.‖ Efficacy was then assessed by items 
pertaining to perceived ease, inconvenience and unpleasantness in receiving colorectal cancer 
screening. Responses were coded on a Likert scale from 1-7, with 1 = not at all and 7 = very. 
Next, participants received an article containing general information on colorectal cancer 
and screening, which also served as the incentive to participate in the test. Immediately following 
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the article, the same four contingency questions from the pilot study with the community sample 
(gain-frame x incentive for both screening and treatment and loss-frame x disincentive for both 
screening and treatment) were included in the survey. Answers to these questions, however, were 
converted to percentages due to the chance that individuals outside of the US with different 
monetary systems might participate. The validity of any answers they would have given to 
contingency questions based on a dollar system would have been questionable. Furthermore, no 
questions were included about the location from which the participants were taking the survey, 
so this could not have been controlled for in analyses. Thus, answers to the questions ―How 
much of an increase [decrease] in your monthly payment would this insurance plan have to 
propose for you to get screened for CRC now?‖ ranged from less than 1% to 100% or greater, 
with the final choice as ―I would not get screened.‖ Again, the scale for the incentive treatment 
item differed, ranging from ―5% co-pay per month on future cancer treatment‖ to ―1% co-pay 
per month on future cancer treatment,‖ and a final option of ―I would not get screened.‖ 
As in the study with the undergraduate sample, a final series of questions then assessed 
efficacy a second time, as well as intentions to receive screening through responses to the 
statement: ―How likely is it that you will TRY to get a colorectal cancer screening exam in the 
next 6 months?‖ Responses were recorded on a seven-point scale: from 1 = extremely unlikely to 
7 = extremely likely. Regulatory fit was also assessed subsequent to exposure to the contingency-
messages through the same two measures as before: ―How would you feel if you were able to 
successfully get screened for colorectal cancer in the next 6 months?‖ and ―Imagine that you 
tried and failed to get a colorectal cancer screening exam in the next 6 months. How would you 
feel about this?‖ For these questions, responses were recorded on a scale from 1 to 19, with 1 = 
very bad and 19 = very good (Higgins, 2000). 
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In this survey, type of behavior was not manipulated as a variable as it was in the first 
experiment; rather, it was included in a different way. When the study with the undergraduate 
sample failed to replicate the interactions between message frame and type of behavior that are 
typically reported in the message framing literature, it was observed that this failure was likely 
due to the fact that message framing experiments use a pamphlet or passage to explain and 
thereby prime the behavior before giving the gain/loss message. However, that study did not 
include any such passage, although the pilot study did. Colorectal cancer screening, which was 
the detection behavior presented to every participant in this survey, was therefore primed with a 
short passage about the different types of screening (including FOBT, sigmoidoscopy, and 
colonoscopy) immediately before the message in these questionnaires, in order to ensure that the 
message framing paradigm was mirrored as closely as possible.  
Additionally, the hypothetical contingency scenarios were not varied by participant. 
Instead of randomizing participants into one of four conditions, each with just one scenario, this 
survey had a within-groups design regarding contingency. All participants received all four 
contingency items—two regarding cancer screening and two regarding cancer treatment—, just 
as the participants of the pilot study did. The purpose of this was fourfold. First, this was done to 
further examine the effects of contingency in more realistic scenarios, by drawing from and 
comparing current programs, such as consumer-directed healthcare, in which the adoption of 
preventive health behaviors result in a reduction in insurance premiums, and the German law, in 
which screening behavior will affect subsequent treatment costs, if individuals develop cancer. 
Second, the within-groups design regarding the hypothetical scenarios was repeated from the 
pilot study because participants’ reactions to each of the different designs were deemed relevant 
to expose individual preferences of effective monetary values in incentives vs. disincentives. 
Third, the within-groups design also required a smaller sample. Because this was a community 
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study, recruitment was expected to be more difficult than it was to get participants from the 
undergraduate subject pool. Finally, these questions were reincorporated, as this survey 
ultimately sought to augment the data set for the contingency questions.  
A final point to note is that participants in this experiment could have been in any stage 
of the screening adoption process, and thus were still eligible even if they had undergone 
screening previously. PAPM measures were excluded primarily to facilitate the Institutional 
Review Board process and avoid complications that may have arisen with them for an online 
survey that would have otherwise collected medical information.  
3.3.3 Results 
3.3.3.1 Demographics 
Of the 25 participants who participated in the online survey, one did not complete it and one was 
excluded from analyses, because she did not meet eligibility criteria for age. The average age of 
the remaining 23 participants was 61.31 (SD = 9.05), of whom 14 (58.3%) were female. The 
majority of participants (91.7%) identified as White/Caucasian, while one person identified as 
White/Caucasian and Black, and one as Asian/Asian American. Twenty-two (91.7%) reported 
that they currently had some kind of healthcare coverage, and one participant declined to answer.  
3.3.3.2 Attitudes toward Healthcare 
In general, participants were much more positive and knowledgeable about their insurance 
provider’s comprehensiveness in covering cancer screening and treatment costs than the 
government’s effectiveness in doing either. Insurance screening coverage was in fact rated very 
highly (M = 1.64, SD = .58). Only one person was unsure of his/her cancer screening coverage. 
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Of the rest, all but one rated this coverage as either ―good‖ or ―very good.‖ For cancer treatment, 
three individuals expressed uncertainty about the comprehensiveness of their plans in covering 
these costs, whereas all other participants but one again rated their policies as either ―good‖ or 
―very good‖ (M = 1.7, SD = .57). Ratings were much more negative for government 
effectiveness in covering both screening costs (M = 3.2, SD = .86) and cancer treatment (M = 
2.93, SD = 1.10). Differences between the means for beliefs regarding insurance and government 
coverage of cancer screening were significant (t(14) = -5.87, p < .001), as were differences 
between beliefs about coverage of cancer treatment by the insurance and the government (t(14) = 
-3.85, p < .01). Only one person rated government effectiveness at covering screening costs as 
―very good.‖ Two participants gave this rating to government coverage of cancer costs.  
3.3.3.3 Intention and Efficacy Items 
Reported intentions to receive screening were low (M = 3.88, SD = 2.28). Independent samples t-
tests revealed no significant gender difference (t(14) = -.03, p = .98).  
 Responses to efficacy measures varied. For the item regarding the ease of colorectal 
cancer screening, responses tended towards ―not at all easy‖ (M = 3.18, SD = 1.98). However, 
for the items assessing inconvenience (M = 3.21, SD = 1.58) and unpleasantness of screening (M 
= 3.26, SD = 1.94), responses were more skewed to the positive answer choices ―not at all 
inconvenient‖ and ―not at all unpleasant,‖ respectively. After reverse coding the ―ease‖ item, 
paired samples t-tests were conducted. Though the differences between the responses to the 
inconvenience and unpleasantness questions were not significant (t(22) = .46, p = .65), 
significant differences did exist between the means for both the ease and inconvenience items 
(t(16) = 3.43, p < .01), as well as between the means of the ease and unpleasantness items (t(16) 
= 2.93, p = .01) (see Figure 6 on the next page).  
 62 
One point to note is that the aforementioned means represent the responses to the second 
set of efficacy items after participants had read the article on colorectal cancer and screening. 
Means for the ease (M = 3.22, SD = 1.93), inconvenience (M = 3.57, SD = 1.44), and 
unpleasantness (M = 3.43, SD = 1.62) items answered prior to reading the article showed the 
same trends, with ease of screening rated less positively on average than the other efficacy 
measures. Again, the latter two means did not differ significantly (t(22) = .46, p = .65); however, 
the differences between ease and inconvenience (t(22) = -2.74, p = .01) and ease and 
unpleasantness (t(22) = -3.45, p < .01) were significant. Furthermore, differences between pre- 
and post-article efficacy items also were not significant for the two items assessing ease (t(16) = 
.36, p = .72), inconvenience (t(18) = 1.10, p = .29), or unpleasantness (t(18) = 1.16, p = .26). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean responses to efficacy items as a function of time and measure from 1 = not at all to 7 = very 
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3.3.3.4 Contingency Questions  
Once again, answers to the open-ended incentive question were characterized by a great deal of 
variability. Responses ranged from $0 to $1000 (M = 108.52, SD = 217.89). 
Descriptive analyses of the contingency scenarios again revealed differences in the mean 
responses to each of these items (see Figure 7). The incentive treatment item [9] again received 
the highest mean response (M = 3.10, SD = 2.02). This time, however, responses to the 
disincentive screening item [6] were the lowest (M = 1.90, SD = 1.22). For the disincentive 
treatment item [7] the reported effective monetary amount was the second lowest of the scenarios 
(M = 2.05, SD = 1.20), whereas the incentive screening scenario [8] again resulted in the second 
highest mean response (M = 2.45, SD = 2.06). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Mean reported monetary percentages for effective contingency interventions as a function of type of 
intervention and behavior 
Paired samples T-tests comparing these means, again revealed no significant differences; 
however, trends toward significance were even more marked in this study. There were no 
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significant differences between the responses to the disincentive scenarios (t(19) = -1.14, p = 
.27). In fact, these analyses showed that the difference between the means was moving slightly 
away from significance in comparison to the results obtained for this t-test in the previous study 
(t(7) = 1.43, p = .20). Further analyses revealed that the responses to the two disincentive items 
were also significantly correlated (r(18) = .89, p < .001), as they had been in the previous study. 
When the responses for the incentive and disincentive screening items were compared this time, 
however, means again did not differ significantly (t(19) = -1.50, p = .15), but were approaching 
significance, especially in comparison to the results of the t-tests in the previous study (t(7) = -
.26, p = .80). These items remained significantly correlated at the p = .05 level (r(18) = .51, p < 
.05), as they had been in the pilot (r(6) = .80, p < .05). Responses to the incentive screening and 
disincentive treatment also remained significantly correlated (r(18) = .46, p < .05). 
Z-scores were again calculated for comparison with the incentive treatment question. 
This time, responses to the incentive treatment scenario were significantly correlated with both 
the disincentive screening (r(18) = -.57, p < .01) and the disincentive treatment (r(18) = -.45, p < 
.05) items, but not to the incentive screening question (r(18) = -.18, p = .46). This latter 
correlation, however, is still noteworthy and may reach significance with a larger sample size. 
Whereas in the pilot study, responses to this item were not correlated with any of the other 
contingency scenarios, it is interesting that they became significantly correlated with the 
responses to both of the disincentive items given a larger sample size, but not with participants’ 
responses to the other incentive question. An additional point to note is that all of the correlations 
are negative, suggesting that the higher[lower] the monetary amount selected in response to the 
incentive treatment item, the lower[higher] the amount selected for both of the disincentive 
scenarios and even for the incentive screening scenario, albeit not significantly in this latter case.  
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3.3.3.5 Regulatory Focus 
Analyses showed that responses to first item assessing satisfaction with the successful 
completion of the behavior were higher (M = 14.74, SD = 4.60) than the responses to the 
question assessing dissatisfaction at failing to perform the behavior (M = 5.82, SD = 3.43). When 
the responses to the latter item were reverse coded, however, paired samples t-tests of the two 
means revealed no significant difference between these means (t(16) = -.04, p = .97), contrary to 
what had been predicted. Since the means of the regulatory fit items did not differ significantly, 
no general effect of contingency salience on regulatory focus was observed.  
3.3.4 Study 3: Discussion 
Though the hypotheses regarding regulatory focus were not supported, this survey revealed 
general attitudes towards current coverage of cancer screening and treatment, both by insurance 
providers and the government. In general, participants rated their insurance coverage very 
positively with regard to both colorectal cancer screening and treatment, but were much less 
positive about the government’s effectiveness on these topics. This makes sense, given that the 
Pennsylvania legislature just instituted a law mandating colorectal screening coverage in 2009. 
Though the survey was online, it was advertised on the Pittsburgh Craigslist, so it is likely that at 
least some participants were Pennsylvania residents, although no questions asked for location of 
the participants to confirm this. Even for those who were not Pennsylvania residents, the US has 
no national program for colorectal cancer screening, so reference to the federal government’s 
involvement would have been validly represented by the participants’ responses, as well.  
 Analyses of perceived efficacy in colorectal cancer screening further revealed beliefs that 
perceived ease of screening is significantly lower than perceived inconvenience or 
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unpleasantness of the tests. These results were consistently found in efficacy measures answered 
both before and after reading an article that provided information about colorectal cancer and the 
corresponding screening tests. Such findings suggest that attitudes about screening are more 
negatively skewed with regard to actually receiving the test rather than peripheral attitudes such 
as inconvenience or unpleasantness.  
Results of this study also provided evidence to support the predictions made based on the 
findings from the pilot study: namely, that there are differences between incentives and 
disincentives, which would approach significance with a larger sample size. Indeed, results from 
this study indicate trends in the expected direction. Furthermore, participants’ responses to both 
disincentive scenarios were, again, significantly correlated. As in the last experiment, one 
participant chose the highest response on the scale: ―I would not get screened.‖ This participant’s 
responses were included in statistical analyses because he/she did respond to both disincentive 
questions; in fact, he/she chose the second lowest amount (5% per month) on both disincentive 
items. In this individual’s case, disincentives were successful in promoting screening, whereas 
incentives were not. Because incentives failed to work in one case for both community sample 
studies, whereas disincentives were universally convincing, this possibility for differential effects 
on behavior by incentives versus disincentives merits further inquiry among a larger sample. 
On that note, one limitation of this study was, still, the sample size. Though larger than 
the pilot study, and large enough that some significant findings and trends were observed, a 
bigger sample would have been ideal for obtaining more conclusive results.  
Another potential limitation was that answers to the contingency items were converted to 
percentage scales to allow for the possibility that other individuals in countries with different 
monetary systems would also be able to answer, since it was an online survey. The argument 
could be made that this conversion from raw numbers to percentages may have led to the trends 
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toward significance observed in the analyses. In fact, perhaps these findings are not comparable 
at all to the findings from the previous study, but rather are different responses chosen from 
different scales. Yet the trends observed in this survey were consistent with the predictions made 
in the pilot study about what would happen with a larger sample size. There was one exception to 
this, and that concerned the incentive treatment item. Responses to this scenario were negatively 
correlated with all other contingency items, which seemed surprising, especially with regard to 
the other incentive item. One would expect that, if responses to both disincentive scenarios are 
positively correlated, responses to both incentive measures should be positively correlated also. 
Recall, however, that correlations among the disincentive responses were highly significant, 
whereas responses among the incentive scenarios were not significantly correlated. This leaves 
open the possibility that the negative correlation may have disappeared with a larger sample size. 
Either way, further testing would be necessary to answer these questions sufficiently. 
This study also could not examine the relationships between contingency and chronic 
regulatory focus or stages of behavior change in the adoption of cancer screening (as 
contextualized in the PAPM). In fact, previous screening behavior was not assessed at all for the 
aforementioned reasons. These would be important avenues for future studies on contingency to 
pursue. Such information would be valuable for healthcare providers and governments alike, as 
both patient compliance and participation in screening programs are related to maintenance 
behaviors. If the use of contingency is more successful in certain stages than others or if there is 
a point along the spectrum of behavior change at which the use of contingency is optimal, this 
knowledge would greatly improve uptake of screening. Previous PAPM studies suggest that this 
may be the case, as efficacy has been shown to aid the transition between the stage in which a 
person has decided to act to and the stage of acting (Weinstein, Lyon, Sandman & Cuite, 1998).   
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Furthermore, that the hypothesis regarding regulatory focus was not supported may have 
resulted from the within-groups design of this study. In the experiment with undergraduate 
participants, significant differences in both intentions to undergo screening and in regulatory fit 
were observed between the contingency conditions. Meanwhile, in the previous community 
sample study, incentives and disincentives seemed to promote screening at similar monetary 
amounts, and thus were believed to have a common effect on screening behavior. These 
divergent results of the two studies were attributed to the different ages of the participants. Given 
this assumption that incentives and disincentives engender a common response among older 
populations, contingency as a whole was also predicted to have a common effect on regulatory 
focus among older participants. However, the small sample size of the pilot study may have 
masked an extant difference between incentives and disincentives. Trends suggesting that such a 
difference may exist even among older populations were revealed in the results of this study. The 
hypothesis for this survey regarding the relationship between contingency and regulatory focus, 
however, relied upon the condition that incentives and disincentives had the same effect. If these 
two constructs differentially impact responses in older populations as they did among younger 
participants, no effect would have been observed on participants’ responses to the regulatory fit 
items, as participants received both incentive- and disincentive-based messages first. Any effect 
that incentives or disincentives may independently have on regulatory focus would have also 
been obscured by exposing participants to both constructs. Thus, a between-groups design would 
have better examined the relationship between contingency and regulatory focus.  
Future studies should therefore not only include assessments of PAPM stage and chronic 
regulatory focus, but also manipulation of contingency variables in a between-groups design. 
Moreover, contingency scenarios should be developed in parallel for incentives and 
disincentives, because of the contradictory findings regarding the responses to the incentive 
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treatment item from this and the previous study. Specifically, such studies should include an 
incentive treatment question that mirrors the current disincentive treatment item, as well as a 
disincentive treatment item that mirrors the construct of the incentive treatment question, as 
some current legislation does use contingency in this way (like the German law).  
Accordingly, if these questionnaires were expanded, future studies should administer 
them to participants in many different countries in order to examine the effects of contingency in 
various cultural contexts. Responses to contingency may vary in virtue of the different healthcare 
systems and practices of different countries. Knowledge of such cross-cultural differences is 
increasingly pertinent, as governments throughout the world incorporate the various constructs of 
contingency into actual legislation, thereby laying the groundwork for a natural experiment on 
contingency on a state and national scale. Germany has begun to employ disincentives to 
encourage screening, whereas England promotes screening uptake through the use of efficacy. 
Japan and some US states have even begun to consider the use of incentives to this end.  
Prerequisite to such an experiment is the necessity for a survey of current programs and 
screening rates, as such comparisons that currently exist in the literature are limited to one or two 
countries or confined to geographic regions, such as the EU. Thus, the final step of this series of 
studies was to conduct a preliminary natural experiment by comparing the frameworks of 
existing screening programs and assessing broad trends in screening behavior across countries.  
3.4 STUDY 4: ARCHIVAL ANALYSIS OF SCREENING LEGISLATION 
To complete this analysis of contingency, a cross-cultural archival component, with the aim of 
assessing trends in national and international participation rates and correlating them with 
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aspects of government intervention, was included. In the literature, there are many studies 
reporting the cost-effectiveness of or expected mortality reduction achieved through mass 
colorectal cancer screening, for these are the questions most central to a policy maker’s decision 
to implement a screening program. However, the results of such studies are often based on 
achieving a set screening rate—sometimes as great as 50-60%—, as they rely on pilot data or the 
success of screening programs in other countries to draw their conclusions (Ministry of Health, 
2006). If a screening program is instituted because it is reported prospectively to achieve a given 
outcome, the cost-effectiveness and morality reduction figures will be dependent upon the 
attainment of that screening rate. Yet little comparative research has been conducted on which 
contingency programs work best and to what levels various types of mass screening 
interventions can be expected to raise participation rates. These questions regarding which types 
of interventions are useful public health policy tools for raising the screening rate levels to the 
target required for the programs to be maximally effective and best serve the people they are 
designed to protect remain largely unanswered. Thus, the assumption that a given level of 
participation will be attained when an intervention is implemented is a logical flaw in many of 
these studies that purport to predict the medical outcomes of such programs and thus underlie 
policy makers’ decisions.  
This archival study sought to provide evidence in support of the implementation of 
national screening programs. Screening behavior and public policy across European countries, 
the United States, Canada, Australia, Japan, and Korea—all of which at least had documented 
national screening data and some of which had implemented governmental mass screening 
programs—were examined. The programs of each country were rated on the degree to which 
each program exemplified the spirit of a type of contingency and the degree to which they 
facilitated access to screening. This examination was aimed at uncovering patterns and 
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relationships between screening participation and aspects of the various interventions currently 
being implemented throughout the world.  
In the case of the United States, there is no screening program at the federal level, but 
state governments have in recent years imposed legislation mandating varying degrees of 
insurance coverage of colorectal cancer screening. As alluded to in the discussion of state laws in 
section 1.2.2, considerable variance in the stipulations of many state laws exists, in terms of 
comprehensiveness of the mandate and efficacy in covering costs of screening. So, although the 
US programs were not included in international comparisons due to the variability in the state-
level legislation, state laws also merited attention. The relevant legislation or statute in each 
state’s constitution was therefore examined and rated on several dimensions before being 
correlated with the respective screening rates for that state. Though various types of insurance, 
such as consumer directed healthcare programs, have been gaining popularity in the US, they 
were not included in any analyses, as the majority of the population does not yet belong to these 
types of programs, nor are these programs included in governmental intervention.  
3.4.1 Hypotheses 
First, [1] states and countries with screening legislation or programs were predicted to have 
higher screening rates than those without. For both state legislation and national programs, [2] 
the higher the degree of efficacy provided, the higher the screening rates were predicted to be. 
Specifically, states with legislation that mandated the most comprehensive coverage of the costs 
of the screening tests, and offered the greatest degree of patient choice in determining which test 
to receive were expected to have higher screening rates than those with less comprehensive 
coverage and less patient input in screening. This is because both of these elements were 
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believed to increase consumer efficacy, and, therefore, encourage screening more effectively. 
Additionally, the scope of the mandate was expected to be correlated with screening rates, as the 
more insurance providers required in the legislation to cover costs, the greater the number of 
consumers who benefit and can participate. For the cross-cultural comparisons, programs 
offering the greatest degree of efficacy in receiving screening were predicted to be correlated 
with the highest screening rates. Finally, [3] since colorectal cancer screening is a detection 
behavior, countries with the most disincentive-oriented programs were believed to have the 
highest levels of screening compliance, whereas countries with incentive-oriented programs were 
believed to exhibit the lowest screening rates. Efficacy-oriented programs were believed to have 
screening rates in between these two extremes. 
3.4.2 Procedure 
3.4.2.1  State Analyses  
Screening rate data from 2006 were collected from a United States government website run by 
the National Cancer Institute http://statecancerprofiles.cancer.gov/ for comparative state 
analyses. Three types of data were collected: 1) FOBT screening rates in both the past year and 
past two years; 2) endoscopy (sigmoidoscopy/colonoscopy) screening rates for both the past five 
years and the past ten years; and 3) all screening tests according to regulations over the past five 
and past ten years. Each data set was collected for men, for women, and then for both. These data 
were exported into Excel format and then analyzed using SPSS. The screening laws were 
accessed on individual state legislature web-sites. In only one case—that of Washington D.C.—
was the state legislature website unavailable. A commissioned report delineating the points of the 
relevant legislation was examined for this case, instead. Laws were then analyzed by reading 
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through the text and rating the program on five dimensions—including comprehensiveness of the 
mandate and efficacy in covering costs of screening, and degree to which individuals are able to 
choose which screening tests they would undergo. This was done on two different occasions. The 
legislation was rated on Likert scales from either 1-5 or 0-5 on all five dimensions for each state: 
1) Financial Efficacy (1 = no costs covered to 5 = all costs of all tests covered), 2) 
Comprehensiveness of Cancer Prevention (1 = no test covered to 5 = all tests covered according 
to ACS guidelines), 3) Mandate Comprehensiveness (0 = No mandate for any insurance plans to 
5 = All health insurance plans), 4) Population Targeting (1 = No one covered to 5 = Everyone as 
defined by ACS guidelines is covered), and 5) Choice efficacy (1 = No choice of test to 5 = 
Individual, or individual and doctor, may choose test) (See Appendix E).  
Twelve states—Alaska, Colorado, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, 
Pennsylvania, and Washington—currently have screening laws, which were rated and used in 
descriptive analyses. However, their legislation did not come into effect until after 2005 
(Entertainment Industry Foundation National Colorectal Cancer Research Alliance, 2005). These 
states were therefore coded as states without screening laws for the purposes of comparative and 
correlational analyses, because screening data was collected from 2006, at which point these 
states had not yet implemented legislation. Though Alaska passed such a law in 2006, no date 
could be found referencing when it went into effect. Accordingly, it is unknown to what degree 
this would have affected screening rates, especially given the typical response and recognition 
lags associated with the implementation of public policy. One final point is noteworthy in light 
of the fact that the data used was taken from 2006. State legislation for this study was analyzed 
based on the original provisions under which the laws came into effect. Provisions or addenda 
that have been added to the legislation since 2005 were excluded from the ratings collected for 
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these analyses. Thus, every effort was made to ensure that the data could be compared with the 
contemporaneous situation established by the legislation. 
3.4.2.2 Cross-cultural Analyses  
First, screening programs were examined in each country in which they exist to any extent. 
Sources for these analyses included government websites, the National Institutes of Health, and 
various reports comparing aspects of some of the current programs, developed both for 
publication in journals and for presentation to the European Commission. These programs were 
rated on Likert scales by type of program (1 = No program, 2 = Pilot underway, 3 = Regional 
program, 4 = Opportunistic, 5 = National program), incentive used in the program (1 = Incentive, 
3 = Efficacy, and 5 = Disincentive), and degree of efficacy provided by the framework of the 
program (1 = None, 2 = On your own (opportunistic), 3 = Distributed by the doctor/GP provider, 
4 = Invitations are mailed, 5 = Invitations, tests, and instructions are mailed, 6 = Invitations, 
tests, and instructions are mailed along with a personal communication).  
The most recent national screening rate data were then collected from government 
websites whenever it was available and could be found in German, French, or English. These 
data usually comprised screening rates from 2006 or 2007, and no data from before 2000 counted 
for the purposes of this study. Screening rates for Germany, Ireland, Switzerland, France, Japan, 
Korea, Finland, Spain, the United States, and Slovakia were found from their respective 
government or Health Ministry websites.  
For those data that could not be found or were not available due to a lack of national data 
collection efforts by governments, one of two methods was used. First, if national data was 
unavailable in a government source, the screening rates would be found in studies or pilots that 
assessed both baseline and post-manipulation screening levels, with the baseline or control 
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screening rates taken as a measure of screening uptake. For example, national screening rates for 
Israel could not be found on any government or government ministry websites, so they were 
taken from a study examining the effects of a more formal invitation based screening paradigm 
in contrast to the opportunistic screening program currently in effect by the Ministry of Health. 
In that study (Ore, Hagoel, Lavi & Rennert, 2001), the baseline screening rate served as the 
measure of the current national screening rates, which is the figure that was used for analyses in 
this study. If pilot tests with this information also were not available, the European Commission-
sponsored survey from 2007 called the ―Eurobarometer survey‖ was consulted. This survey, 
administered across all European Union countries, specifically assessed FOBT screening 
behavior in the past year. Since most screening programs, such as those in England, France, 
Japan, Slovakia, Australia, and Finland are FOBT-based, screening rates are generally reported 
in terms of FOBT participation, with follow-up colonoscopy participation rates separately 
reported. Thus, the Eurobarometer survey did not pose a concern with regard to comparing data 
with these countries.  
However, other countries, such as the US and Switzerland tended to report aggregate 
screening data of participation in FOBT and endoscopy, though participation in each of the tests 
is also specified. Thus, FOBT screening rates for Switzerland and the US were selected for the 
purpose of analysis. For both Germany and Poland, colonoscopy is a primary screening tool. 
Since higher participation is associated with FOBT screening in Germany, however, FOBT 
screening rates were selected. The national program in Poland, however, only advocates for 
colonoscopy screening, so FOBT uptake was deemed unrepresentative of the true screening rate. 
As a result, the screening figures for colonoscopy were used in analyses. 
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3.4.3 Results 
Ratings were first compared for reliability, and all ratings for both states and countries were 
identical except one dimension for two states, which resulted from misreading the first time. 
3.4.3.1 State Analyses 
(a) Descriptives 
Overall, 32 states had some kind of screening legislation by 2009, whereas 19 had none. Of the 
states with legislation, the majority (43.8%) had laws mandating insurance coverage of all of the 
tests, albeit subject to co-payments and deductibles at the discretion of the provider, and the laws 
in only eleven states (34.4%) explicitly limited the application of co-payments and deductibles to 
screening coverage within the legislation. Most legislation (46.9%) mandated coverage by the 
majority of insurance providers in the state, with only a few exceptions, and fourteen states 
(43.8%) mandated coverage by all insurance providers within the state. Approximately half 
(46.9%) of all state policies required coverage according to American Cancer Society guidelines, 
while one quarter (25%) of the laws had vague guidelines concerning screening coverage. The 
vast majority (62.5%) of all screening laws required coverage to be provided to all individuals as 
defined by the ACS, whereas eight states (25%) required coverage for individuals age 50 and 
older and at high risk, but defined high risk in a way that fell short of ACS guidelines. However, 
a high percentage of state laws (59.4%) failed to enumerate among the provisions the ability of 
the patient or doctor to choose the test. Only seven states (21.9%) explicitly required that the 
choice of test remain at the discretion of the primary care provider (PCP), and legislation in only 
four states provided consideration for patients’ preferences in selection of the screening test. 
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Finally, legislation in only two states—Alaska and Arkansas—explicitly required insurance 
providers to communicate the coverage of these tests to their clients. 
Screening rate averages were low in all analyses. FOBT participation in the last year 
ranged from six to 20 percent (M = 16.11, SD = 3.09) but was higher when participation over the 
last two years was considered (M = 24.63, SD = 4.19). In both cases, men (M = 16.74, SD = 
3.41) and (M = 24.95, SD = 4.29), respectively, participated more than women (M = 15.58, SD = 
3.18) and (M = 24.35, SD = 4.44).  Paired samples t-tests revealed that these differences were 
significant (t(50) = 3.57, p < .01) with respect to FOBT screening in the past year, but not when 
FOBT rates over a two year period were considered (t(50) = 1.69, p = .10). 
Endoscopy screening rates over the past five and ten years were much higher (M = 49.39, 
SD = 6.00) and (M = 55.17, SD = 5.86), respectively, than either measure of FOBT screening 
rates, reflecting preferences for sigmoidoscopy and colonoscopy over FOBT testing in the US. 
Based on endoscopy screening data over the past five years, men (M = 50.02, SD = 6.43) were 
again significantly more likely than women (M = 48.84, SD = 5.93) to receive an endoscopy 
(t(50) = 3.09, p < .01). Yet the gender difference between participation in men and women 
disappeared when screening rates over the last ten years were considered (t(50) = .37, p = .72). 
Total screening rates (including both annual FOBT and/or endoscopy participation) over 
the last five years for all tests ranged from approximately 46 to 66 percent (M = 55.53, SD = 
5.70), with men exhibiting higher rates (M = 56.02, SD = 5.88) than women (M = 55.10, SD = 
5.75). This difference was significant (t(50) = 2.99, p < .05). Meanwhile, participation in all 
CRC screening procedures over the last ten years ranged from 50 to 70 percent across states (M 
= 60.41, SD = 5.47), with no difference when stratified by gender. Both men (M = 60.43, SD = 
5.73) and women (M = 60.38, SD = 5.44) exhibited similar rates of screening participation, and 
any difference between the means was not significant (t(50) = .16, p = .87) (see Figure 8).  
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Figure 8. Screening participation rates as a function of test and gender. 
(b) Hypothesis [1] 
Independent samples t-tests revealed no significant difference between states with and states 
without screening legislation in FOBT participation either within the previous year (t(49) = -.66, 
p = .51) or within the past two years (t(49) = -1.00, p = .32). Even when screening rates were 
stratified by gender, no significant difference was observed between states with and without 
legislation. FOBT screening rates for men were no higher in states with legislation both when 
data regarding participation over one year (t(49) = -.12, p = .91) or two (t(49) = -.79, p = .43) 
were used in the analyses. Screening rates among women also did not vary based on state 
legislation, either when data from the one year period (t(49) = -1.14, p = .26) or from the two 
year data set were considered (t(49) = -1.16, p = .25).  
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 Analyses of endoscopy screening rates over a period of five years also revealed no 
significant differences due to screening laws (t(49) = .35, p = .73). This lack of significance was 
observed both for men (t(49) = .19, p = .85) and for women (t(49) = .54, p = .59). When total 
endoscopy participation over the past ten years was considered, results moved even farther away 
from significance (t(49) = .21, p = .84), even when the data were stratified by gender.  
 Finally, aggregate screening rates for all tests did not differ significantly between states 
with and without legislation, both when a five year period (t(49) = .06, p = .95) or a ten year 
period (t(49) = -.03, p = .97) was considered. Additionally, no significance differences were 
observed for participation among men or women with either data set. 
(c) Hypothesis [2] 
Finally, data sets for FOBT screening, endoscopy screening, and total screening participation 
were correlated with three dimensions on which the state laws were rated: comprehensiveness of 
coverage (financial efficacy), degree to which patient was allowed to choose a screening test 
(choice), and scope of the mandate. 
 Analyses of FOBT screening rates revealed no significant correlations on the financial 
efficacy dimension, either for the one year (r(49) = -.05, p = .71) or the two year data set (r(49) = 
-.10, p = .47). For the choice variable, no significant correlations were found among states with 
screening laws for either data set, (r(18) = -.19, p = .42) and (r(18) = -.28, p = .24), respectively. 
Analyses of mandate comprehensiveness also revealed no significant correlations for the one 
year (r(49) = .07, p = .63) or two year (r(49) = -.003, p = .98) period. Furthermore, no significant 
correlations were found for any of these dimensions when FOBT data was stratified by gender. 
 Endoscopy screening data for the past five years was also not significantly correlated 
with financial efficacy (r(49) = .07, p = .63), choice (r(18) = .03, p = .89), or mandate 
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comprehensiveness (r(49) = .16, p = .26). For the ten year data set, results were not significant 
on any of these dimensions (r(49) = .05, p = .74), (r(18) = -.01, p = .97), and (r(49) = .14, p = 
.33), respectively. Moreover, no significant gender differences were found for any of these 
dimensions.  
Finally, total screening participation over periods of five and ten years was examined. 
Analyses of the five year data set again showed no correlations with financial efficacy (r(49) = 
.03, p = .82), choice (r(18) = .03, p = .89), or mandate comprehensiveness (r(49) = .13, p = .35). 
The ten year totals did not ameliorate this, as none of the correlational analyses on financial 
efficacy (r(49) = .02, p = .91), choice (r(18) = -.01, p = .97), or mandate comprehensiveness 
(r(49) = .12, p = .45) were significant. Even when stratified by gender, results showed no 
significant correlation on any of these dimensions.  
3.4.3.2 Cross-cultural Analyses 
(a) Descriptives 
Of the 36 countries analyzed, 15 (40%) were found to have screening programs in effect. Five of 
these programs were opportunistic, and nine were formal national programs. Only one country 
(Italy) had a regional program; however, for the regions in which the program is operational, it 
can be characterized as following a national program paradigm (formal invitations are mailed 
along with FOBT kits). Screening rates in each of the countries ranged from .06% in Israel to 
90% in Uruguay (based on pilot data) with a mean of 18.15 (SD = 21.83).   
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(b) Hypothesis [1] 
Independent samples t-tests confirmed the first hypothesis—that countries with screening 
programs would exhibit significantly higher levels of screening than countries without (t(34) = 
4.59, p < .001). Because screening rates in Uruguay were so high and based on pilot data, t-tests 
were performed again without them, and results remained significant (t(33) = 4.61, p < .001). 
Additionally, since endoscopy screening is more common in Switzerland than FOBT screening 
and US screening totals are much higher than FOBT rates alone, t-tests were performed one final 
time with endoscopy and total screening rates in those countries, respectively (still without 
Uruguayan data). Still, the finding that countries with screening programs had significantly 
higher screening participation than countries without held (t(33) = 3.60, p = .001). 
 Univariate analyses revealed that screening rates differed significantly in virtue of the 
type of program in effect (no program, pilot program, regional program, opportunistic program, 
or national formal program) both without Uruguayan data (F(4, 34) = 4.99, p < .01) and with it 
(F(4, 35) = 2.98, p < .05). In both of these analyses, US screening totals were used.  
(c) Hypothesis [2]   
Correlational analyses were conducted to examine the relationship between degree of efficacy 
provided by the programs and the respective screening rate for the country. Uruguayan data was 
again excluded as a statistical outlier, especially because it was based on pilot results. Results 
revealed that the higher the degree of efficacy, the higher the level of screening participation, 
both when only FOBT rates were considered for all countries except Poland, (r(33) = .70, p < 
.001) and when US totals and Swiss endoscopy screening rates were included (r(33) = .60, p < 
.001). In both cases, these results were significant. 
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(d) Hypothesis [3]   
After extensively researching the programs across 36 countries in North and South America, 
Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, 15 were found to have screening programs (see Table 5 on 
the following page). However, of those programs, 13 were efficacy-based. Only Germany was 
using a disincentive in any form, and some evidence was found that Japan incorporates 
incentives into its screening program by providing tax grants for cancer screening (Ministry of 
Health, Labor and Welfare, 1999). Consequently, there was not enough variability to conduct 
analyses to test the third hypothesis. As the use of disincentives and incentives become more 
popular within healthcare systems worldwide, it would be worthwhile to reexamine this point. 
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Table 5. National Colorectal Cancer Screening Programs 
 
 
 
 
Program 
 
National Programs (Year Began)             Screening Rate Tests Offered 
 
Australia (2008)* 
 
National Organized 
 
 
45% (Pilot) 
 
FOBT/Col follow-up  
 
Austria (2005)* 
 
 
National 
 
 
17% 
 
 
FOBT/Sig/Col 
 
Czech Republic (2000)* 
 
 
National 
 
 
7% 
 
 
FOBT/Colonoscopy 
 
Finland (2004)* 
 
National Organized 
 
70% 
 
 
FOBT/Col follow-up 
 
France (2008)* 
 
National Organized 
 
42% 
 
FOBT/Col follow-up 
 
Germany (1977-FOBT, 
2002-Colonoscopy)* 
 
 
Opportunistic 
 
 
19% (FOBT); 
 
12% (Col) 
 
 
FOBT/Colonoscopy 
 
Israel (2004)* 
 
Opportunistic 
 
 
0.06% 
 
 
FOBT/Col follow-up 
 
 
 
Italy (2000)* 
 
 
Opportunistic (Col) 
Regional (FOBT) 
 
 
 
44% 
 
Col (free by law since 2000); 
FOBT regional; Sig. pilot 
underway 
 
 
Japan (1992)
+ 
 
 
 
National 
 
 
18.1% 
 
FOBT/Col or Double Contrast 
Barium Enema follow-up 
 
 
Korea (2004)
* 
 
 
 
National 
 
 
16% 
 
FOBT/Col or Double Contrast 
Barium Enema follow-up 
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Poland (2000)* 
 
 
Opportunistic 
 
10% 
 
Colonoscopy 
 
Slovakia (2002)
+
 
 
 
Opportunistic 
 
30% 
 
FOBT/Col follow-up 
 
 
Switzerland (2005)*
 
 
 
 
Opportunistic 
 
28% (FOBT); 
32% (Sig/Col) 
 
 
FOBT/Sig/Col 
 
UK (2006)* 
 
National Organized 
 
67% 
 
 
FOBT/Col follow-up 
 
Uruguay (1997)* 
 
 
National 
 
90% (Pilot) 
 
FOBT/Virtual Col follow-up 
*Denotes 100% coverage of tests. 
+Denotes screening subject to co-pay or deductibles. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Colorectal Cancer Screening Programs as a function of type and screening rate  
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3.4.4 Study 4: Discussion 
This study was aimed at surveying governmental programs and legislation regarding colorectal 
cancer screening, as well as uncovering trends in screening behavior across states and countries. 
Overall, 32 states and 15 of the 36 countries analyzed had some form of intervention in place. No 
significant differences were found in screening rates between states that had laws mandating 
insurance coverage of colorectal cancer screening tests and states that did not. Cross-cultural 
analyses did reveal significant differences in screening rates between nations that have and do 
not have screening programs, and these differences were significantly correlated with the degree 
of efficacy provided by the program. This leads to the question: why did interventions outside 
the US appear to be more successful at increasing screening rates than those within its borders? 
One possible explanation may be that, even without laws mandating insurance coverage 
of the screening tests by all providers, a majority of providers already offer at least partial 
coverage. Indeed, the United States General Accounting Office (2004) examined the policies of 
35 national plans as well as 19 small employer and 15 individual plans in ten states lacking laws 
to mandate insurance coverage of colorectal cancer screening tests. They found that, though 
coverage of colorectal cancer screening is not universal among insurance providers, even in 
states without legislation, most major health insurers cover the costs of these exams, at least to 
some extent. Laws that mandate insurance coverage may therefore affect relatively few 
individuals in terms of their preventive health behavior, as most insurance plans cover these tests 
already. Indeed, in the online survey study, all participants except for one were aware to some 
extent about their insurance providers’ coverage policies regarding colorectal cancer screening. 
Among those who stated an opinion about how comprehensive their insurance coverage of the 
screening tests was, all but one rated their policies as either “good” or “very good.”  
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Also, in the American Cancer Society study (2006a), results showed that the effect of 
these laws is to increase the screening rate more quickly in states with screening legislation than 
in states without it (see Figure 2). Attempting to replicate these findings was beyond the means 
of this study, as data sets that were available were only from 2006, so no comparative analyses 
with data from other years could be conducted.  
Another part of the explanation for the apparent ineffectiveness of coverage legislation in 
raising screening rates above participation in states without such laws may be that the majority of 
state laws only mandate coverage that is reasonable with respect to other health benefits provided 
in the plan. In other words, laws in many states (fourteen) continue to allow the application of 
deductibles and co-payments. Only in eleven states’ legislation are limits explicitly placed on 
these additional costs. In contrast, many of the screening programs abroad offer screening at no 
cost. Therefore, screening tests in the United States remain subject to co-payments and 
deductibles even among states with legislation, which may be enough to deter individuals who 
would screen if it were free from doing so when only part of the test is covered by insurance.  
That no significant correlations on the financial efficacy variable were observed for both 
the FOBT screening data and the endoscopy data is also suggestive of the fact that the degree of 
efficacy these laws provide for receiving endoscopy screening is minimal. First, FOBT testing is 
substantially cheaper than endoscopy screening (Campbell, Coates & Chattopadhyay, 2006). In 
addition, unlike the national screening programs in England and France, individuals generally 
receive no direct communications to encourage screening uptake as a condition of state 
legislation. Only in Alaska and Arkansas do the laws even require providers to inform clients 
about screening coverage. Thus, one would expect that legislation mandating insurance coverage 
of screening tests would not affect FOBT uptake in any way, especially not in terms of financial 
efficacy, and so the findings in the correlational analyses for these data were unsurprising. 
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The difference in screening rates between states with such legislation and states without 
would be expected to be observed in endoscopy screening rates, either for sigmoidoscopy or 
colonoscopy, upon the institution of these laws. But no differences were observed in these 
analyses, either. Such legislation may provide only limited marginal efficacy for receiving 
endoscopy screening versus having no such laws. Even opportunistic programs such as those in 
Germany and Poland provide more efficacy for screening. Though they do not formally invite 
individuals to screen, they do at least offer complete reimbursement for endoscopy screening, the 
costs for which are high. State laws at best place limits on the degree to which co-payments and 
deductibles can be applied to these tests and at worst leave the determination of final costs of 
screening to the providers’ discretion. As a result, there is no guarantee that screening exams are 
necessarily made more affordable by these laws. Whereas the implementation of this type of 
legislation continues to serve a purpose in ensuring that the maximum number of individuals is 
covered for cancer screening, its effect on raw screening rates may be only marginal.  
Despite the apparent failure of state legislation to promote screening beyond the levels in 
other states without legislation, screening rates overall were higher than in most other countries, 
ranging from an average of 50.53% over five years to 60.02% over ten. Additionally, rates for 
endoscopy screening specifically were almost four times greater than those for FOBT testing, 
with around 50% of individuals on average reporting that they underwent either a sigmoidoscopy 
or colonoscopy exam in the past five years, which seems to alleviate the concern that endoscopy 
screening may be unaffordable without legislation mandating insurance coverage. In contrast to 
the results from the online survey, in which no significant gender differences in intentions to 
screen were observed, analyses in this study revealed that actual screening rates among men 
were on average significantly higher than women. This finding is consistent with the results of 
several previous studies, which have reported that men in the United States tend to exhibit higher 
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screening rates than women (Meissner, Breen, Klabunde & Vernon, 2006; Codori, Peterson, 
Miglioretti & Boyd, 2001).  
One final note about state laws is that several states, including Arkansas (Senate Bill No. 
SB947, 2009), Illinois (Senate Bill No. SB 0270, 2009), and Kentucky (House Bill No. HB415, 
2008) have recently proposed and passed legislation regarding the implementation of state-wide 
colorectal cancer screening programs that provide free access to screening tests, specifically 
among the uninsured. In Colorado, recent legislation has even begun to encourage insurance 
providers to incorporate incentives, including ―premium discounts and reduced out-of-pocket 
costs for healthcare services‖ into their healthcare plans to promote uptake of preventive health 
behavior (House Bill No. HB09-1012, 2009). 
Results from the state analyses thus failed to support all of the corresponding hypotheses; 
however, cross-cultural analyses of screening data significantly upheld both of the hypotheses 
that were tested. Although countries with screening programs, whether national or opportunistic, 
had higher screening rates than those without, the question that arose from this research was: 
why are screening rates outside the US still relatively low across the board?  
One survey of 21 European countries conducted by Keighley and colleagues (2004) 
found that 75% of participants surveyed across countries expressed interest in FOBT screening if 
it were free. Still, screening rates across Europe remain very low, even among some countries 
with national programs. That there are varying degrees of public awareness as well as varying 
capacities among medical systems to handle demand for screening may contribute to the 
explanation for this apparent paradox (Kanavos & Schurer, 2007). Indeed, Loss, Eichhorn, and 
Nagel (2005), found gross lack of awareness among a Bavarian population; however, awareness 
of the screening tests was found to be 30% higher for this population than in US participants.  
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Additionally, the average waiting time for results of a colonoscopy has been found to 
vary by country but is generally long across most European countries, ranging from five days in 
Denmark, to one to three months in the UK (Kanavos & Schurer, 2007). This is especially 
disconcerting, as colonoscopy in the United Kingdom is offered as a follow-up to abnormal 
FOBT results, leaving patients awaiting answers regarding their health for weeks at a time. If the 
public is aware of this factor, it may influence decisions about screening behavior, despite the 
success the United Kingdom has seen in the early stages of the implementation of its national 
program. In Poland, purported financial difficulties in funding the program also may help to 
explain low screening participation levels there (Keighley et al., 2004). Meanwhile, Germany has 
extensive quality control measures for its gastroenterology services (Pox, Schmiegel & Classen, 
2007), but the German population continues to exhibit surprisingly low screening uptake.  
Some screening programs are subject to the same criticism as US legislation: namely—
that screening tests remain subject to external costs, such as premiums and deductibles. In Japan, 
premiums for Employees’ Health Insurance comprise roughly eight percent of one’s income, 
though employers pay about half of this amount (Bennett, Weinberg, & Lieberman, 1998). 
Moreover, all medical services are subject to a ten percent co-payment (Bennett, Weinberg, & 
Lieberman, 1998). Yet these factors do not seem sufficient for completely explaining low 
screening rates, as the Japanese program is FOBT-based, which is inexpensive. 
In Israel, which had the lowest screening rates of all the countries examined in this study, 
beliefs have been espoused that low colorectal cancer screening participation may be related to 
cultural factors, such as customs of modesty, religiosity, and fatalism among Arab populations. 
Indeed, Azaiza and Cohen (2008) did find higher levels of external health locus of control in 
Arab Israelis, potentially attributable to their beliefs that God plays a role in determining health. 
Cross-cultural differences in health beliefs, however, were also found across European nations, 
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with Finnish participants exhibiting the most resistance to talking about colorectal cancer 
symptoms (91%) and Icelandic participants expressing the least (39%) (Keighley et al., 2004). 
Given the high levels of participation in the Finnish national colorectal cancer screening 
program, this result seems paradoxical, as cultural inhibitions to talk about colorectal cancer 
symptoms do not seem to affect screening participation in that case. Interestingly, this study also 
revealed that Finnish participants exhibited the lowest level of awareness regarding colorectal 
cancer incidence, which is again surprising given their participation in screening programs.  
An additional point of interest for future research is that, in the recently conducted 
―Eurobarometer Survey,‖ one item asked respondents in each country why they had undergone 
cancer screening. Results revealed that 10% of Austrians who had been screened did so because 
of a screening program according to self-report (European Commission, 2007b). In contrast, with 
the exception of Germany at three percent, only one to two percent of survey participants from 
all other EU countries attributed their screening participation to a screening program (European 
Commission 2007b). The stark contrast may be attributed to recent efforts to augment public 
awareness campaigns in Austria (Pox, Schmiegel & Classen, 2007). Yet the Czech Republic, 
which also has a national screening program, has also emphasized increasing public awareness of 
the program through intensive ad campaigns (Zavoral 2006; 2008) with much less success in 
boosting overall screening rates or in encouraging its people to receive screening as a result of 
the program. Only two percent of respondents from the Czech Republic reported that they 
received screening because of the national program (European Commission, 2007b).  
This study had several limitations. First, only one rater coded legislation and screening 
programs. This was primarily done out of necessity due to the linguistic demands and time 
constraints required by the nature of the inquiry. However, the dimensions for which ratings 
were conducted were rather unambiguous. For example, there is little room for debate with 
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regard to whether a country has a screening program or does not or which kind of contingency 
construct is being employed within it. State laws were similar enough that they almost 
universally corresponded verbatim with one rating for each of the dimensions on which they 
were coded. To avoid error, sources from which ratings given to both state and national 
programs were drawn were reviewed several times and the coding was checked each time. 
In seeking correlations between screening rates and state legislation, this study also 
makes two unsupported assumptions. First, though having insurance has been consistently 
correlated with greater participation in colorectal cancer screening (Zapka et al., 2002; Codori, 
Peterson, Miglioretti & Boyd, 2001; Bastani, Gallardi & Maxwell, 2001), this study presupposes 
that individuals are informed about their insurance plans and, specifically, coverage of colorectal 
cancer screening tests. While this may be the case for states in which laws require providers to 
inform their clients that screening tests for colorectal cancer are covered, this argument is weak, 
as it only refers to two states—Alaska and Arkansas—, neither of which had screening 
legislation in effect by the year in question (2006).  
Secondly, it assumes that doctors are aware of coverage laws. With the sheer number of 
insurance providers in the US, it is impossible to expect that doctors’ recommendations to 
undergo cancer screening would be influenced by whether screening is covered or not and much 
less by whether laws exist to mandate this coverage. Studies have found having a regular primary 
care provider is correlated with higher screening rates (Codori, Peterson, Miglioretti & Boyd, 
2001; Meissner, Breen, Klabunde & Vernon, 2006), and doctors’ recommendations specifically 
have been found to be one of the strongest predictors of subsequent screening behavior (Janz, 
Wren, Schottenfeld, & Guire, 2003; Azaiza & Cohen, 2008) at all stages of colorectal cancer 
screening adoption (Costanza et al., 2005). Thus, if PCP behavior is unlikely to change in 
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response to legislation that mandates insurance coverage, this may also explain why variations in 
such laws across states were not reflected in screening participation.  
Cross-cultural analyses were specifically subject to the criticism that there was an over-
reliance on FOBT data. This was true, in that the screening rates that were compared generally 
concerned only FOBT screening, except for Poland. For most countries, these rates were 
probably accurate representations of screening participation due to the reliance of national 
screening programs on that test. Still, the use of FOBT data may have underrepresented 
screening uptake, especially for the United States (with FOBT rates of 16.11% in comparison 
with 60% as the total screening rate), where endoscopy screening is significantly higher than is 
the use of FOBT. Yet results remained significant even when overall US and Swiss screening 
data were used and when outliers such as Uruguay, which achieved unusually high participation 
rates, were omitted from analyses.  
A final limitation is that details of the screening situation in many countries, both in terms 
of participation rates and governmental action, were not assessed, in part due to language and 
data availability constraints. Ideally, future research would include a massive effort to compare 
all countries on many more dimensions than contained within the scope of this research. 
Especially important is further examination of cross-cultural issues, such as the observed 
differences in screening among minorities and ethnicities in many countries (Bastani, Gallardo & 
Maxwell, 2001; Janz et al., 2003; Natale-Pereira et al., 2008; National Health Service, 2003; 
2006; Kanavos, Schurer, Owusu-Apenten & Sullivan, 2008; Azaiza & Cohen, 2008). 
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4.0  GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Though relatively new to public policy for cancer screening, the use of contingency constructs in 
governmental interventions is growing on an international scale. Fifteen countries currently have 
either national or opportunistic screening programs in effect and many more, including Spain 
(Gutierrez-Ibarluzea, Asua & Latorre, 2008), Norway (Gutierrez-Ibarluzea, Asua & Latorre, 
2008), Sweden (Blom, 2007), New Zealand (Ministry of Health, 2009), and Denmark (Gutierrez-
Ibarluzea, Asua & Latorre, 2008), are conducting pilot studies with FOBT and colonoscopy 
follow-up. Additionally, sigmoidoscopy screening is being used in Italy (Kanavos, Schurer, 
Owusu-Apenten & Sullivan, 2008), and considered in Norway (Gutierrez-Ibarluzea, Asua & 
Latorre, 2008) and Sweden (Blom, 2007). Though they have adopted and implemented an 
FOBT/colonoscopy paradigm for their national program, the United Kingdom also conducted a 
trial on sigmoidoscopy and again found high levels of compliance (Atkin et al., 1998).  
The crux of many of these programs lies in contingency, but only in the form of efficacy. 
Two countries, Germany and Japan, have responded to chronically low screening rates by 
incorporating disincentives and incentives, respectively, into their policies. Additionally, the 
state of Colorado has recently begun to encourage insurance providers to offer incentives to their 
clients, with the intention of further promoting preventive health behavior. Thus, these research 
studies collectively sought to investigate these government interventions and explain the 
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acceptance of and response to them by concomitantly seeking a more theoretically grounded 
understanding of contingency through empirical analysis of participants in the United States. 
Although contingency has been shown to be effective in the short term for discrete 
behaviors (Kane et al., 2004), its effects in these studies remain inconclusive. Contingency-based 
messages engendered different effects in older and younger populations. In the undergraduate 
study, incentives were found to be more likely than disincentives to promote cancer screening 
behavior, whereas no significant effects were observed among participants over 50. Trends 
observed in the community sample studies even suggested that the opposite effects are true of 
contingency for such populations: that disincentives may prove to more effectively promote 
screening. Moreover, although relationships between contingency and regulatory focus were 
found in the first experiment, they were not replicated in the community sample studies. No 
significant correlations between contingency and risk perceptions were observed, either.  
Some evidence was found in the first experiment to suggest that disincentives may 
promote perceptions of self-efficacy with regard to performing a screening behavior more 
effectively than incentives. Further study should explore these issues cross-culturally, especially 
with regard to the effects of incentives and disincentives on perceptions of self efficacy, as most 
interventions currently operate through the use of efficacy. If the use of incentives and 
disincentives impact those perceptions, the addition of these constructs to existing interventions, 
as in Germany, may influence the effectiveness of the intervention. 
Finally, the use of efficacy itself was significantly predictive of increases in screening 
rates in international analyses. Yet just as no correlations were found between states with and 
without laws mandating insurance coverage, Medicare populations in the United States, for 
whom screening is covered subject to a deductible, have also not shown increases in screening 
rates as a result of this coverage, with participation remaining low among beneficiaries 
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(Engelman, Ellerbeck, Ahluwalia, Nazir & Velasco, 2001; Ko, Kreuter & Baldwin, 2002; 
Cooper & Kou, 2007).  
Above all, these studies collectively replicate one of the primary conclusions on which 
the current literature on contingency is unified: effects of contingency are inconsistent (Kane et 
al., 2004; Shah et al., 1998). Although the most successful dependent measures in these studies 
were regulatory fit items, the results did not provide any clear conclusions about the nature and 
modus operandi of contingency. Age and gender differences were found, but relationships 
between contingency and message frame, regulatory focus, and risk perceptions were not 
consistently observed. Further insight into contingency may lie in the pursuit of several 
additional factors not examined in these studies. 
First, the influence of contingency on continuing or maintenance behaviors is largely 
unsubstantiated in the research. In general, this presents a problem because, even if the initial 
adoption of the behavior is facilitated through the use of contingency, according to national 
guidelines, the maximum effectiveness of colorectal cancer screening as a preventative tool is 
achieved only through regular screening. Thus, if the conclusions of the previous research are 
replicated and supported with more precise theoretical justification, and contingency is found to 
be an effective tool for promoting individuals to perform a given behavior once, interventions 
may require additional elements to encourage behavior maintenance. If contingency is only 
influential in patients’ decisions and considerations early in the behavior adoption process but 
not in decision-making subsequent to the initial performance of the behavior, colorectal cancer 
screening rates in countries with the aforementioned governmental interventions would be 
expected to demonstrate immediate upsurges after the interventions have taken effect. After a 
few years, however, these rates may drop again, and possibly even return to pre-intervention 
levels. Indeed, in the series of English pilot studies, this trend was observed, in that FOBT 
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participation decreased by about 10% between the first and second studies, which is not 
attributable to a changing subject pool, as the same participants in the same communities were 
used for both studies (National Health Service, 2003; 2006). This possibility presents serious 
implications for all current screening programs, whether they are national, opportunistic, 
regional, or state-based in nature. If screening rates peak upon the implementation of the 
program, only to fall thereafter, these programs will demonstrate initial success, but will be 
limited in their abilities to promote such preventive health behaviors in the long run. The 
longevity of the effectiveness of contingency is thus an integral component in the long-term 
success of these programs and merits further investigation.  
Given the findings regarding efficacy in these studies, increasing efficacy over time may 
present a viable option for expanding and maintaining the success of these programs. Previous 
studies (Ore, Hagoel, Lavi & Rennert, 2001; Courtier et al., 2002), have demonstrated that, as the 
amount of efficacy provided in screening interventions increases, so does uptake. One study even 
presented a potential modification current screening programs modeled after the UK paradigm 
could make to account for attrition rates in participation should they be observed. Courtier and 
colleagues (2002) found that including personal interventions by a non-medical professional to 
personalize the screening process improves compliance even over formal invitations containing 
FOBT test kits. Pilot testing in Spain and the French national program indeed already incorporate 
such a personalized aspect. Even if efficacy could be increased over time, however, programs 
would eventually be unable to keep growing in this way to encourage continued screening. Thus, 
the success of contingency in promoting maintenance of preventive health behavior is a critically 
important object of inquiry for mass screening programs. 
Another possible line of inquiry with regard to contingency and its effectiveness in 
encouraging maintenance behaviors would be the use of noneconomic-based factors that mirror 
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the use of economic incentives and disincentives in current programs. An example of such an 
intervention might be the use of time. For example, individuals who undergo screening could be 
given a priority or VIP status so that they would not have to wait at their doctor’s offices when 
they come in for subsequent appointments (incentive). Conversely, individuals would be 
punished with longer waiting times if they fail to get screened (disincentive). Time is certainly a 
valuable commodity for individuals of all ages, and offering contingency with respect to 
eliminating or threatening to increase time constraints may be a powerful use of contingency in 
interventions. Additionally, if noneconomic incentives and disincentives were shown to be as 
effective as economic-based contingency, this would provide governments with a less expensive 
and therefore more feasible alternative for interventions or screening programs on a federal level 
than purely economic contingency-based programs. 
 Further study should also examine contingency in the context of the respective 
healthcare systems. Socioeconomic factors (Fukuda, Nakamura, Takano, Nakao & Imai, 2007; 
Eisinger et al., 2008; having insurance (Zapka et al., 2002; Codori, Peterson, Miglioretti & Boyd, 
2001; Bastani, Gallardi & Maxwell, 2001), and barriers to screening as contextualized in the 
Health Behavior Model (Wardle et al., 2000) all do seem to be consistently correlated to 
screening participation across national boundaries. However, there are likely additional cross-
cultural differences that may obfuscate any similarities and differences in screening behavior and 
in response to contingency observed between the countries of interest. For instance, although 
family history has been consistently correlated with higher screening rates in the US (Shah et al., 
2007; Shah, Zhu, Palmer & Wu, 2007; Stark, Bertone-Johnson, Costanza & Stoddard, 2006), one 
survey reported a lack of awareness among Europeans that family history is even a risk factor for 
developing colorectal cancer, with an average of 54% of all participants surveyed across twenty-
one European countries unaware of this fact (Keighley et al., 2004). Additionally, though gender 
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differences exist, men have been consistently reported as exhibiting higher screening rates than 
women in the US (Meissner, Breen, Klabunde & Vernon, 2006; Codori, Peterson, Miglioretti & 
Boyd, 2001), whereas women tend to exhibit higher screening rates then men outside the US 
(Kanavos, Schurer, Owusu-Apenten & Sullivan, 2008; Blom, 2007; Altenhofen, 2006; 2008; 
Felix Burda Stiftung, 2002).  
These differences will likely be further complicated by the growing trend of immigration 
and multiculturalism, especially within the EU, as several studies in the US (Bastani, Gallardo & 
Maxwell, 2001; Janz et al., 2003; Natale-Pereira et al., 2008), England (National Health Service, 
2003; 2006), Australia (Kanavos, Schurer, Owusu-Apenten & Sullivan, 2008), Israel (Azaiza & 
Cohen, 2008), and Germany (Heisel et al., n.d.; Kanavos, Schurer, Owusu-Apenten & Sullivan, 
2008) have demonstrated differential participation in preventive cancer screening among 
minorities. Such disparities have been attributed not only to the generally lower socioeconomic 
status (SES) observed for minorities (Natale-Pereira et al., 2008), but also to cultural differences 
between ethnicities (Szczepura et al., 2006; Azaiza & Cohen, 2008) and an inability to translate 
the pro-con ratio of screening (decisional balance) to immigrants in the context of the culture and 
language of the host country (Otero-Sabogal, Stewart, Shema & Pasick, 2007). Efforts are 
underway in Germany (Kanavos, Schurer, Owusu-Apenten & Sullivan, 2008) and the United 
States to encourage colorectal cancer screening in particular among minorities though Turkish 
and Spanish advertisement campaigns, respectively. For example, in the United States, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention have begun to incorporate Spanish advertisements 
into their ―Screen for Life‖ program (CDC, 2009). Unfortunately, the participant base in these 
studies was not diverse enough to examine these issues further; however, future studies would 
clearly be well-served to focus on the role contingency might play in facilitating this 
communication or potentially even hindering it. Specifically, the relationship between 
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contingency and decisional balance would be a very interesting and promising avenue for 
additional research.  
One general problem, however, is that all of these studies relied on self-report in terms of 
participation in preventive health behaviors, including sunscreen use and colorectal cancer 
screening. Self-reporting of colorectal cancer screening behavior, however, has been found to be 
accurate (Baier et al., 2000). A second problem is that presenting contingency in the context of 
gain- and loss-framed messages necessitated that questionnaires assumed a primarily 
hypothetical nature. Most studies in the body of gain- and loss-framed message literature, 
however, have adopted and accepted this construct as a valid measure for examining responses to 
variously framed messages (Rothman, Bartels, Wlaschin & Salovey, 2006) and one study also 
found that expressed interest in hypothetical screening situations was predictive of later 
colorectal cancer screening behavior (Wardle et al., 2000).  
Given that colorectal cancer is the second leading cause of cancer-related death in the 
Western world and results in an estimated national expenditure for colorectal cancer treatment at 
$5.5-$6.5 billion per year in the US alone (Campbell, Coates & Chattopadhyay, 2006), the 
importance of increasing colorectal cancer screening rates among at-risk populations is 
incontrovertible. From a fiscal standpoint, early colorectal cancer treatment is estimated to cost 
on average $30,000 per patient, whereas the average per patient cost of late treatment skyrockets 
to $120,000 (Arnst, 2007; Burke, 2007). Yet if polyps can be detected before they are allowed to 
develop into cancer, the patient avoids both early and late cancer treatment costs, in addition to 
the reduced quality of life that is not included in the aforementioned estimates but often 
accompanies the process of cancer treatment. Furthermore, when colorectal cancer is diagnosed 
in its earliest stages, the five-year survival rate for patients is greater than 90%; however, the 
prognosis for survival decreases to only about 10% when it is diagnosed in its late stages (ACS, 
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2006c). Widespread screening has, therefore, been predicted to reduce colorectal cancer 
mortality by 15% to 60%, depending upon the type and comprehensiveness of the screening test 
considered in the calculations (Campbell et al., 2006). Thus, attention must be directed to 
contingency research and finding the most effective means for encouraging colorectal cancer 
screening, as it not only saves money for the patient, insurance providers, and the government, 
but also—most importantly—it saves countless lives. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXPERIMENT 1 CONTINGENCY MESSAGES 
Incentive X gain/loss X prevention 
The University of Pittsburgh is always changing the fees that students are charged. Every year, 
all students at the University of Pittsburgh pay a flat Student Health fee amounting to $130. This 
fee is included in tuition. For next year, one possible change that the University Administration 
is considering is altering this policy based on students’ health behavior. One of the new 
considerations is the use of sunscreen. If you [do not] use sunscreen regularly, you can apply for 
and receive [will not be eligible for] a $30 reduction on this fee, which would decrease your 
yearly tuition costs to $100.  
Incentive X gain/loss X detection  
The University of Pittsburgh is always changing the fees that students are charged. Every year, 
all students at the University of Pittsburgh pay a flat Student Health fee amounting to $130. This 
fee is included in tuition. For next year, one possible change that the University Administration 
is considering is altering this policy based on students’ health behavior. One of the new 
considerations is an annual skin cancer screening exam with a university dermatologist. If you 
[fail to] see the dermatologist annually for a skin cancer screening exam, you can [cannot] apply 
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for and receive a $30 reduction on this fee, which would decrease your yearly tuition costs to 
$100. 
Disincentive X gain/loss X prevention 
The University of Pittsburgh is always changing the fees that students are charged. Every year, 
all students at the University of Pittsburgh pay a flat Student Health fee amounting to $130. This 
fee is included in tuition. For next year, one possible change that the University Administration 
is considering is altering this policy based on students’ health behavior. One of the new 
considerations is the use of sunscreen. If you [fail to] use sunscreen regularly, you can avoid 
[may be charged] a $30 increase in this fee, which would increase your yearly tuition costs to 
$160. 
Disincentive X gain/loss X detection 
The University of Pittsburgh is always changing the fees that students are charged. Every year, 
all students at the University of Pittsburgh pay a flat Student Health fee amounting to $130. This 
fee is included in tuition. For next year, one possible change that the University Administration 
is considering is altering this policy based on students’ health behavior. One of the new 
considerations is an annual skin cancer screening exam with a university dermatologist. If you 
[fail to] see the dermatologist annually for a skin cancer screening exam, you can consequently 
avoid [be charged] the $30 increase in this fee, which would increase your yearly tuition costs to 
$160. 
Information-only X gain X prevention 
The use of sunscreen has been shown to dramatically decrease risk for skin cancer. This is 
because sunscreen is the most effective way of preventing skin cancer, which is the most 
common cause of cancer related deaths in the US. 
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Information-only X loss X prevention 
The use of sunscreen has been shown to dramatically decrease mortality from skin cancer. This 
is because using sunscreen is the most effective way to protect already damaged skin cells from 
developing into skin cancer. 
Information-only X gain X detection 
An annual skin cancer screening exam with a dermatologist is the most effective way of 
removing precancerous cells and thereby preventing skin cancer from developing, which is the 
most common cause of cancer related deaths in the US.  
Information-only X loss X detection 
An annual skin cancer screening exam with a dermatologist is the most effective way of 
detecting skin cancer, which is the most common cause of cancer related deaths in the US, and 
treating it early.  
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APPENDIX B 
BASELINE QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
1. What do you think are your actual chances of getting colorectal cancer in your lifetime? 
Would you say 
a) Extremely unlikely 
b) Very unlikely 
c) Somewhat unlikely 
d) Neither likely nor unlikely 
e) Somewhat likely 
f) Very likely 
g) Extremely likely 
h) Don’t know 
 
2. If your doctor or health plan told you that they would pay you to get a colorectal cancer 
screening test, what is the minimum amount they would have to pay you to go in and get 
a colorectal cancer screening test sometime in the next two weeks? 
a) I would have to be paid $__________ to get screened in the next two weeks. 
 
3. Do you have any kind of healthcare coverage, including health insurance, prepaid plans 
such as HMOs, or government plans such as Medicare? 
IF YES:  
a) Do you have Medicaid/Medicare? 
i. Yes 
ii. No  
b) Do you have any other type of insurance? 
i. Yes 
ii. No  
c) How good do you think that your insurance is in covering your costs for 
colorectal cancer screening tests? 
i. Very good 
ii. Good 
iii. Bad 
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iv. Very bad 
v. Don’t know 
d) How good do you think that your insurance is in covering your costs for 
colorectal cancer treatment? 
i. Very good 
ii. Good 
iii. Bad 
iv. Very bad 
v. Don’t know 
 
4. Indicate your level of agreement/disagreement with this statement: the government 
should be more involved than they are now in making colorectal cancer screening easier 
to get. 
a) Strongly disagree 
b) Disagree 
c) Agree 
d) Strongly agree 
e) No opinion 
 
5. Would you support a law that required all insurance companies in the state to cover 
colorectal cancer screening? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
 
6. Now, I’m going to read you a list of organizations. Before being contacted for this study, 
had you ever heard of:  
a) …the National Institutes of Health? 
i. Yes 
ii. No 
b) …the American Cancer Society? 
i. Yes 
ii. No 
c) …the Cancer Information Service? 
i. Yes 
ii. No  
d) …the National Cancer Institute? 
i. Yes 
ii. No  
e) …the 1-800-4-Cancer information number? 
i. Yes 
ii. No 
f) …the United States Center for Cancer Prevention Research? 
i. Yes 
ii. No 
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7. How effective do you think such government-funded agencies are in promoting public 
health by informing and educating the public about cancer and cancer screening through 
PSA’s or commercials sponsored by any of the groups just listed, websites, pamphlets, 
brochures, etc.?  
a) Very effective 
b) Effective 
c) Ineffective 
d) Very ineffective 
e) Don’t know 
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APPENDIX C 
LAB SESSION QUESTIONNAIRE FOR EXPERIMENT 2 
1) If your doctor or health plan told you that they would pay you to get a colorectal cancer 
screening test, what is the minimum amount they would have to pay you to go in and get 
a colorectal cancer screening test sometime in the next two weeks? 
1. I would have to be paid $__________ to get screened in the next two weeks. 
 
For the next few questions, you will be given various scenarios. Remembering your risk 
information you received during this session, please answer the corresponding questions. 
2) (LOSS-FRAMED/DISINCENTIVE SCREENING QUESTION)  
For the next question, suppose you had insurance that covered cancer screening, with a 
monthly payment (premium) of $280. However, your insurance payments are based upon 
whether or not you are screened regularly for colorectal cancer as recommended by your doctor 
now. If you do not get screened now, your monthly premiums will increase and your monthly 
insurance payments would be higher. 
How much of an increase in your monthly payments would this insurance plan have to 
propose for you to get screened for CRC now?  
1. Less than $10 per month 
2. $10 per month 
3. $20 per month 
4. $50 per month 
5. $75 per month 
6. $100 per month 
7. Greater than $100 per month 
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8. I would not get screened. 
 
3) (LOSS-FRAMED/DISINCENTIVE TREATMENT QUESTION) 
For the next question, suppose again that you had insurance that covered cancer 
screening, with a monthly payment (premium) of $280. However, your insurance payments are 
based upon whether or not you were screened regularly for colorectal cancer as recommended by 
your doctor now, but in a different way. This time, if you did not get screened now AND later 
developed colorectal cancer, your monthly premiums would increase and your monthly 
insurance payments would be higher after you were diagnosed with cancer. 
How much of an increase in your monthly payments would this insurance plan have to 
propose for you to get screened for CRC now?  
1. Less than $10 per month 
2. $10 per month 
3. $20 per month 
4. $50 per month 
5. $75 per month 
6. $100 per month 
7. Greater than $100 per month 
8. I would not get screened. 
 
4) (GAIN-FRAMED/INCENTIVE SCREENING QUESTION)  
For the next question, suppose you had insurance that covered cancer screening, with a 
monthly payment (premium) of $280. However, your insurance payments are based upon 
whether or not you are screened regularly for colorectal cancer as recommended by your doctor 
now. If you get screened now, your monthly premiums would decrease, and your monthly 
insurance payments would be lower. 
How much of a decrease in your monthly payments would this insurance plan have to 
propose for you to get screened for CRC now?  
1. Less than $10 per month 
2. $10 per month 
3. $20 per month 
4. $50 per month 
5. $75 per month 
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6. $100 per month 
7. Greater than $100 per month 
8. I would not get screened. 
 
5) (GAIN-FRAMED/INCENTIVE TREATMENT QUESTION) 
For the next question, suppose again that you had insurance that covered cancer 
screening, with a monthly payment (premium) of $280. However, your insurance payments are 
based upon whether or not you were screened regularly for colorectal cancer as recommended by 
your doctor now, but in a different way. This time, if (and only if) you did get screened now, you 
would be eligible for lower payments on cancer treatment if you developed cancer in the future. 
The average total cost of treatment for colorectal cancer that is detected early is $30,000. 
Say your insurance covered $8,000 regardless of whether or not you had been screened, 
making your co-pay $2,000 a month for one year if you developed cancer. But if you get 
screened prior to being diagnosed with cancer, you will pay less. Which reduced price 
would your insurance plan have to offer instead of the standard co-pay of $2000 in order 
for you to get screened now? 
1. $1900 co-pay per month on future cancer treatment  
2. $1500 co-pay per month on future cancer treatment 
3. $1000 co-pay per month on future cancer treatment 
4. $500 co-pay per month on future cancer treatment 
5. $100 co-pay per month on future cancer treatment 
6. I would not get screened. 
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APPENDIX D 
QUESTIONNAIRES FOR STUDY 3 
1) Do you have any kind of healthcare coverage? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
Prefer not to answer 
 
2) How comprehensive do you think your insurance is at covering preventive cancer 
screening?  
1. Very good 
2. Good 
3. Bad 
4. Very bad 
Don’t know 
 
3) How comprehensive do you think your insurance is at covering cancer costs? 
1. Very good 
2. Good 
3. Bad 
4. Very bad 
Don’t know 
 
4) How effective do you think your government is at covering preventive cancer screening? 
1. Very good 
2. Good 
3. Bad 
4. Very bad 
Don’t know 
 
5) How effective do you think your government is at covering cancer costs? 
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1. Very good 
2. Good 
3. Bad 
4. Very bad 
Don’t know 
 
[ARTICLE on colorectal cancer and screening] 
For the next few questions, you will be given various scenarios. Remembering your risk 
information you received during this session, please answer the corresponding questions. 
 
For the next question, think of your monthly insurance payment (premium). Now suppose 
that this insurance covered cancer screening. However, your insurance payments are based upon 
whether or not you are screened regularly for colorectal cancer as recommended by your doctor 
now. If you do not get screened now, your monthly premiums will increase and your monthly 
insurance payments would be higher. 
6) How much of an increase in your monthly payment would this insurance plan have to 
propose for you to get screened for CRC now?  
1. Less than 1%  
2. 5 % per month 
3. 10% per month 
4. 25% per month 
5. 50% per month 
6. 75%  per month 
7. 100% (your payments would double) 
8. Greater than 100% (your payments would more than double) 
9. I would not get screened. 
 
For the next question, suppose again that you had insurance that covered cancer 
screening, and think of your current monthly payment (premium). Now, your insurance 
payments are based upon whether or not you were screened regularly for colorectal cancer as 
recommended by your doctor now, but in a different way. This time, if you did not get screened 
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now AND later developed colorectal cancer, your monthly premiums would increase and your 
monthly insurance payments would be higher after you were diagnosed with cancer. 
7) How much of an increase in your monthly payments would this insurance plan have to 
propose for you to get screened for CRC now?  
1. Less than 1%  
2. 5 % per month 
3. 10% per month 
4. 25% per month 
5. 50% per month 
6. 75%  per month 
7. 100% (your payments would double) 
8. Greater than 100% (your payments would more than double) 
9. I would not get screened. 
 
For the next question, suppose you had insurance that covered cancer screening. Think of 
your current monthly payments (premium). However, imagine that your insurance payments are 
based upon whether or not you are screened regularly for colorectal cancer as recommended by 
your doctor. If you get screened now, your monthly premiums would decrease, and your monthly 
insurance payments would be lower. 
8) How much of a decrease in your monthly payments would this insurance plan have to 
propose for you to get screened for CRC now?  
1. Less than 1%  
2. 5 % per month 
3. 10% per month 
4. 25% per month 
5. 50% per month 
6. 75%  per month 
7. 100% (your payments would double) 
8. Greater than 100% (your payments would more than double) 
9. I would not get screened. 
 
For the next question, suppose that you had insurance that covered cancer screening and 
think of your current monthly payment. However, your insurance payments are based upon 
whether or not you were screened regularly for colorectal cancer as recommended by your doctor 
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now, but in a different way. This time, if (and only if) you did get screened now, you would be 
eligible for lower payments on cancer treatment if you developed cancer in the future. 
9) The average total cost of treatment for colorectal cancer that is detected early is $30,000 
per year in the US (10,000£ per year in the United Kingdom).* Imagine your insurance 
covered some of the cost from whatever figure applies to you ($30000 if you are in the 
United States, 10,000£ if you are in the UK) regardless of whether or not you had been 
screened. After this insurance coverage, your co-pay each month would be 6% of the 
total cost per year if you developed cancer. But if you get screened prior to being 
diagnosed with cancer, you will pay less. Which reduced price would your insurance plan 
have to offer instead of the standard co-pay of 6% in order for you to get screened now? 
1. 5% co-pay per month on future cancer treatment  
2. 4% co-pay per month on future cancer treatment 
3. 3% co-pay per month on future cancer treatment 
4. 2% co-pay per month on future cancer treatment 
5. 1% co-pay per month on future cancer treatment 
6. I would not get screened. 
 
*Numbers are real figures. 
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APPENDIX E 
STATE RATING SCALE 
Financial Efficacy 
1 2 3 4 5 
No costs covered Some tests 
covered, only 
with co-payment 
All tests covered, 
subject to co-
payments 
All tests covered, 
limited co-
payments 
All costs of all 
tests are covered 
 
Comprehensiveness of Cancer Prevention  
1 2 3 4 5 
No test 
covered 
Fixed amount is 
covered without 
reference to type or 
frequencies of test 
Tests covered, 
but guidelines 
are vague 
Tests covered, with 
reference to or at least 
some tests covered 
according to ACS 
guidelines 
All tests 
covered 
according to 
ACS guidelines 
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Mandate Comprehensiveness 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
No mandate for any 
insurance plans 
Required 
offering 
Medicaid 
only 
Some health 
insurance plans 
Most health 
insurance plans 
All health 
insurance plans 
 
Population Targeting 
1 2 3 4 5 
No one 
covered 
Symptomatic 
individuals 
High risk individuals 
and symptomatic 
50 and older, and high 
risk not according to 
ACS definition 
Everyone as 
defined by ACS 
is addressed 
 
Choice efficacy 
1 2 3 4 5 
No choice of test  Doctor chooses test  Individual (or individual and 
doctor) chooses test 
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